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THE RIGHT TO INCLUDE 
Daniel B. Kelly* 
ABSTRACT 
Recent scholarship has created renewed interest in the “right to exclude.” 
Many contend that, because owners have a right to exclude, private property 
has a tendency to promote individualism and exclusion. But, as I will argue, 
property can promote sociability and inclusion by providing owners with 
various ways of including others. Owners can assert their “right to include” 
by waiving exclusion rights, dividing existing rights by contracts or property 
forms, and creating new co-ownership arrangements. Inclusion is socially 
beneficial insofar as it enables sharing and exchange, facilitates financing and 
risk-spreading, and promotes specialization. Yet inclusion may entail costs, 
including coordination difficulties, strategic behavior, and conflicts over use. 
To mitigate such costs, the law authorizes not only informal and contractual 
inclusion but also inclusion through various forms of property like easements, 
leases, and trusts. By providing owners with a range of options by which to 
include others, these forms help to ensure that an owner’s private incentive to 
include converges with the socially optimal level of inclusion. Each form not 
only binds third parties but also provides owners and those they may include 
with a unique mixture of anti-opportunism devices, such as mandatory rules, 
fiduciary duties, and supracompensatory remedies. Understanding how the 
law promotes the social use of property provides insights into debates over the 
property/contract interface, numerus clausus, and the right to exclude itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article contends that the ability of owners to “include” others in their 
property is a central attribute of ownership and fundamental to any system of 
private property. Too easily overlooked in debates about the right to exclude, 
or the rights of others to be included, is that owners frequently include others 
in the use, possession, and enjoyment of their property. The ability to include 
others—by waiving the right to exclude, dividing existing rights by contract or 
recognized forms of property, or creating new rights and forms—is critical for 
coordinating economic activities and organizing social relationships. 
Owners include others in different ways, with different legal implications. 
Much inclusion is informal, e.g., a dinner invitation or a gratuitous license, in 
which an owner decides not to enforce or to waive the right to exclude. With 
informal inclusion, social norms, rather than law, usually govern the parties’ 
interactions. Inclusion also may be contractual, e.g., an agreement not to 
withdraw a waiver or license. With contractual inclusion, the parties have legal 
remedies, typically damages, if the owner breaches by revoking a waiver or if 
the nonowner breaches by exceeding the scope of a license. In addition to 
waiving exclusion informally or contractually, owners may rely on property 
forms that facilitate inclusion. With proprietary inclusion, each form not only 
binds third parties to a particular division of property but also provides the 
original parties with a unique mixture of anti-opportunism devices, such as 
mandatory rules, fiduciary duties, and supracompensatory remedies. 
In the absence of contracts or property forms, an owner’s private incentive 
to include others might be socially suboptimal. Although some types of 
inclusion might still occur, parties would include others too little, fearful of 
opportunism and conflicts over use. To combat such fears and increase 
cooperation, the law authorizes formal devices like contracts and recognized 
forms of property by which owners may include others. As a result, both 
contracts and property forms can function as assurance mechanisms, 
minimizing the risk of strategic behavior and conflicts over use. 
This Article contends that, due to the risk of opportunistic behavior, a 
proliferation of forms helps to ensure that the private incentive to include 
others converges with the socially optimal level of inclusion. The law 
facilitates cooperation because each form of inclusion entails different costs 
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and benefits, and owners may choose among these various forms in deciding 
whether, and under what circumstances, to include others in their property. 
Generally, informal inclusion (e.g., gratuitous licenses or nonenforcement) 
is less costly than formal inclusion because it relies on social norms rather than 
law. However, if there is a danger of “high-value opportunism,”1 informal 
inclusion may provide parties with too little certainty. If an owner decides to 
withdraw a license or to enforce her rights, the nonowner may have no legal 
remedy. Therefore, while including others via waiver or nonenforcement is, as 
Robert Merges contends, an important “flip side” of exclusion,2 informal 
inclusion, by itself, is inadequate to maximize the social use of property. 
Contractual inclusion (e.g., formal waivers of exclusion or intellectual 
property licenses) can be more costly than informal inclusion, but contracts 
provide more certainty and deter many kinds of opportunism.3 If an owner 
withdraws a contractual waiver or terminates a license, the licensee may sue 
for breach. Conversely, if a licensee exceeds the scope of an inclusion, the 
owner may sue the licensee to vindicate the owner’s rights. Knowing that legal 
remedies are available, both parties may be less inclined to act strategically, 
both at the outset and during performance of the contract. 
Owners also may include others using various property forms, what this 
Article calls “proprietary inclusion.” These property forms, from easements 
and leases to trusts and corporations, are often similar to contracts in many 
ways. But the forms may provide even more certainty and protection against 
opportunism. Specifically, because property rights are in rem and “run with the 
land,” property forms can provide greater certainty than informal or contractual 
inclusion for successive owners and users. Moreover, while contracts deter 
certain types of opportunism, property forms can provide additional protection 
through a greater reliance on mandatory rules and fiduciary duties. Finally, 
unlike contracts, which rely primarily on compensatory damages, property 
forms often entail supracompensatory remedies like specific performance and 
injunctions, punitive damages, and restitution, which may help to deter 
strategic behavior. 
 
 1 See Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. 
L. REV. 749, 761 (2000) (defining high-value opportunism as “opportunism that cannot be deterred by the 
threat of (nonlegal) retaliation”). 
 2 ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 296 (2011). 
 3 See Posner, supra note 1, at 762; see also infra Part III.B. 
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A handful of legal scholars have mentioned inclusion and hinted at its 
importance.4 But they have not yet developed a theory to justify an owner’s 
right to include,5 or compared various forms of inclusion, including contractual 
and proprietary inclusion, in detail.6 To fill this gap, this Article systematically 
analyzes the right to include by assessing the benefits and costs of inclusion. It 
then compares a number of institutional arrangements by which owners may 
include others: from nonenforcement and waiver of the right to exclude, to 
contracts and various forms of property. 
The prior literature does emphasize two social dimensions of property: how 
using property may generate social costs,7 and how owning property may 
entail social obligations.8 This Article highlights another social dimension of 
property, one that is often overlooked. Namely, ownership can be inclusive, 
rather than exclusive; it can facilitate cooperation, not just result in conflict; 
and it frequently promotes human sociability, not atomistic individualism. 
Part I surveys recent debates about exclusion and then distinguishes the 
nonowner’s right to be included from an owner’s right to include. Part II 
discusses why it is difficult to achieve the benefits of inclusion—sharing, 
exchange, financing, risk-spreading, and specialization—while preventing 
opportunism and other costs of inclusion. Part III compares the ways in which 
owners may include others: informal, contractual, and proprietary inclusion. In 
distinguishing among these alternative forms of inclusion, Part III explores 
why each of the forms is instrumental in facilitating the social use of property. 
 
 4 See MERGES, supra note 2, at 295 (“[T]he supposedly exclusive right of property is actually bound up 
with various forms of inclusion.”); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 449 (2d ed. 2012) (“[I]t is important not only to be able to exclude other persons from the thing, but 
also to be able to include other persons in the use and enjoyment of the thing . . . .”); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF 
PROPERTY IN LAW 75 (1997) (“[U]nderstanding the social use of property . . . must be as fundamental to 
understanding property as understanding the way in which property excludes.”). 
 5 Cf. James Penner, Ownership, Co-ownership, and the Justification of Property Rights, in PROPERTIES 
OF LAW 166, 166 (Timothy Endicott et al. eds., 2006) (arguing that “justification of ownership per se depends 
upon the premise that property will generally be shared or co-owned”). 
 6 Cf. Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1856–57, 1860 (2012) 
(delineating several types of “governance property” but noting the analysis “provides only a brief look 
at . . . some of the major [governance property] institutions in modern society”).  
 7 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1960); see also J.J. Laffont, 
Externalities, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 192–93 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence 
E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing how production and consumption can create negative externalities). 
 8 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL 
L. REV. 745, 746–48 (2009); Hanoch Dagan, The Social Responsibility of Ownership, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
1255, 1255–56 (2007); Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic 
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1048 (2009). 
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Each form plays a unique role in deterring opportunism and facilitating 
cooperation. Part IV suggests that understanding an owner’s right to include 
others helps to illuminate several recent debates in property theory. 
I. EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION 
A. Excluding Others from Property 
One justification for property is that, by creating exclusive rights, property 
promotes the efficient use of resources.9 This justification has several aspects. 
First, property may provide individuals with incentives to work.10 Without 
property rights, the private incentive to work may diverge from what is socially 
optimal because a person considers that her output may be taken.11 By contrast, 
with property rights, a person receives the output she produces and has an 
incentive to work the optimal amount.12 Second, property provides incentives 
to maintain and improve things.13 If a person obtains the gains of maintaining 
and improving her property, she will do so consistent with what is socially 
optimal.14 Third, without a right to exclude, a person will devote resources to 
prevent the taking of her things, and other parties will waste their time and 
money attempting to take these things.15 In short, exclusion is said to promote 
the optimal use of resources and to prevent wasteful disputes.16 
Historically, in analyzing property, many jurists have emphasized the role 
of exclusion. For example, William Blackstone’s understanding of property—
as a right to a thing good against the world—involves a robust concept of 
 
 9 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 347, 
356 (1967). 
 10 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (2004). 
 11 Id. at 11–15 (providing numerical examples).  
 12 Id. at 15. 
 13 Id. at 16. 
 14 See id. at 16–18; Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, Property Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 183, 192 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“[P]rivate ownership . . . creates 
incentives for optimal asset maintenance and investment.”).  
 15 See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 20. 
 16 See Demsetz, supra note 9, at 348, 354–56 (describing the evolution of property rights and arguing 
that a “primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of 
externalities”); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1322–32 (1993) (discussing 
advantages of individual ownership and arguing that “the parcelization of land is a relatively low-transaction-
cost method of inducing people to ‘do the right thing’ with the earth’s surface”). 
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exclusion.17 For Blackstone, property was useful for preventing disputes as 
well as providing incentives to work.18 Given Blackstone’s influence on 
American law, this understanding of property—as a right to a thing good 
against the world—was predominant among lawyers and judges until the early 
twentieth century.19 Understanding property as a thing is also consistent with 
how most nonlawyers conceptualize ownership.20 
As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have observed, this idea of property 
declined during much of the twentieth century.21 The writings of Wesley 
Hohfeld,22 and the advent of legal realism,23 contributed to its decline and to 
the rise of a competing view—the idea of property as a “bundle of rights.”24 
Ultimately, as Merrill and Smith explain, the bundle-of-rights view became “a 
kind of orthodoxy” in law schools.25 Moreover, Ronald Coase and other early 
figures in law and economics “did not question the realists’ conception of 
property as a contingent bundle of rights.”26 Even with the ascendancy of this 
 
 17 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (describing “the right of property” as “that sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion 
of the right of any other individual in the universe”). 
 18 See id. at *7–8. 
 19 On the views of other theorists, in addition to Blackstone, see SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 22 & n.13, 
discussing Hobbes, Locke, and Bentham; and Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to 
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360–64 (2001), discussing Hobbes, Smith, and 
Bentham.  
 20 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 98–100 (1977) (stating that 
laypersons view property as thing ownership); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY 
69, 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (“Most people, including most specialists in their 
unprofessional moments, conceive of property as things that are owned by persons.”). 
 21 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 364–66.  
 22 On Hohfeld, see J.E. Penner, Hohfeldian Use-Rights in Property, in PROPERTY PROBLEMS: FROM 
GENES TO PENSION FUNDS 164–74 (J.W. Harris ed., 1997); and Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights 
Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 986–94, 1056–59. For 
earlier analysis of Hohfeld, see generally Walter Wheeler Cook, Hohfeld’s Contributions to the Science of 
Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721 (1919); and Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141 (1938).  
 23 On legal realism, see generally Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY 261, 261–79 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
 24 On property as a bundle of rights, see ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 26–29; Grey, supra note 20, at 
69–71; Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 360–66; and J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of 
Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996). Although “Hohfeld did not use the metaphor ‘bundle of rights’ to 
describe property,” Hohfeld’s legal “theory of jural opposites and correlatives,” coupled with his analysis of in 
rem rights, “provided the intellectual justification for this metaphor, which became popular among the legal 
realists in the 1920s and 1930s.” Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 365.  
 25 Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 365. 
 26 Id. at 366; see also Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1075, 1078 (1997) (“[F]rom Hohfeld and Coase it is an easy step to say that property rights are simply rights, 
to which the term ‘property’ adds nothing at all.”). 
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bundle-of-rights view, most courts, including the United States Supreme Court, 
continue to acknowledge the right to exclude as one of the most important 
rights in the bundle.27 
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the nature of property and the 
right to exclude. James Penner has argued that “the right to property is a right 
to exclude others from things which is grounded by the interest we have in the 
use of things.”28 Likewise, Merrill and Smith have attempted to revitalize the 
idea that “property at its core entails the right to exclude others from some 
discrete thing.”29 These property theorists have attempted to emphasize that 
exclusion is “not an end in itself”30 but rather the “practical means” by which 
an interest in the “use of property” is protected.31 However, their work has 
provoked a number of debates about the nature and purpose of property 
rights.32 
Historically, many prominent intellectuals have had a more pessimistic 
view about the effects of private property on social interaction. For Karl Marx, 
property entails each person attempting “to find satisfaction of his own selfish 
need” and thus “every new product represents a new potentiality of mutual 
swindling and mutual plundering.”33 Marx’s objective was to transcend private 
property in order to return to a “social” existence: “The positive transcendence 
of private property as the appropriation of human life, is therefore the positive 
transcendence of all estrangement—that is to say, the return of man . . . to his 
human, i.e., social, existence.”34 For this reason, in the Communist Manifesto, 
 
 27 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (declaring that the “right to exclude 
others from entering and using her property” is “perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests”); 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“The power to exclude has 
traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”); 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (characterizing the “right to exclude” as being 
“universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 28 PENNER, supra note 4, at 71 (italics removed).  
 29 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at vii; see also id. at 449; accord Thomas W. Merrill, Property and 
the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 742–43 (1998). 
 30 Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American Property 
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 964 (2009). 
 31 PENNER, supra note 4, at 68–74 (discussing the connection between exclusion and use). 
 32 See, e.g., Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property 
Symposium, 8 ECON J. WATCH 193, 194–96 (2011); see also infra notes 37–38. 
 33 KARL MARX, Human Requirements and Division of Labour Under the Rule of Private Property, in 
ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, at 101, 101–02 (Progress Publishers trans., 5th ed. 1977) 
(italics removed). 
 34 KARL MARX, Private Property and Labour. Political Economy as a Product of the Movement of 
Private Property, in ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, supra note 33, at 83, 91. 
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Marx and Friedrich Engels call for the abolition of private property.35 Today, 
few scholars advocate abolishing private property entirely. But there remains a 
certain degree of skepticism about the role of property in a market economy, 
especially as economic inequality, commercial exploitation, and environmental 
degradation have not ceased (and, in some ways, accelerated) since Marx.36 
Thus, there is currently a robust debate over the significance of exclusion. 
Descriptively, many scholars disagree over whether the right to exclude is the 
organizing principle of property law, one right within the bundle of rights, or 
something else.37 Normatively, scholars continue to disagree about the extent 
to which robust private property rights can be consistent with authentic social 
interaction and human flourishing.38 Despite such disagreements, the unifying 
feature of this literature is its focus on the relative importance of exclusion as 
 
 35 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 67 (Penguin Books 1998) (1848) 
(“[P]rivate property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating 
products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few. In this sense, the 
theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.”). 
 36 See, e.g., Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and 
International Perspective, 96 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 200 (2006) (discussing economic inequality); 
Samson Imasogie Omofonmwan & Lucky Osaretin Odia, Oil Exploitation and Conflict in the Niger-Delta 
Region of Nigeria, 26 J. HUM. ECOLOGY 25 (2009) (discussing commercial exploitation and environmental 
degradation).  
 37 See generally Symposium, Property: A Bundle of Rights?, 8 ECON J. WATCH 193 (2011) (compiling 
essays both defending and critiquing the bundle-of-rights view); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the 
Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 593 
(2008) (describing the right to exclude as the correlative of a duty of nonowners to stay away from property, 
which “derives from the norm of inviolability, a defining feature of social existence”); Abraham Bell & 
Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 531 (2005) (“propos[ing] a unified 
theory of property predicated on the insight that property law is organized around creating and defending the 
value inherent in stable ownership”); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 275, 275 (2008) (arguing the central concern of property law is not the exclusion of nonowners, 
but rather maintaining the owner “as the exclusive agenda setter for the owned thing”); Adam Mossoff, What 
Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 439 (2003) (offering an “integrated 
theory” in which property “comprises the exclusive rights to acquire, use and dispose of one’s possessions”); 
Eric R. Claeys, Response, Exclusion and Private Law Theory: A Comment on Property as the Law of Things, 
125 HARV. L. REV. F. 133, 143 (2012), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/forvol125_claeys.pdf 
(advancing a philosophical, rather than economic, view of property in which “property’s exclusivity is always 
calibrated to property’s legitimate use or use-determination”). 
 38 Compare Alexander, supra note 8, at 747–48 (“The core image of property rights . . . is that the owner 
has a right to exclude others and owes no further obligation to them. . . . The law has relegated the social 
obligations of owners to the margins, while individual rights, such as the right to exclude, have occupied the 
center stage.”), with Smith, supra note 30, at 963 (“[Alexander] laments that social obligation appears only 
implicitly in property law and that there is a ‘gap’ between property law and human flourishing. I will 
argue . . . that far from being problems, this implicitness and gappiness is the strength of a property law that 
promotes flourishing.”). 
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the basis of property rights, with little discussion of an owner’s right to include 
others. 
B. Including Others in Property 
Property not only involves exclusion but also entails inclusion. Inclusion 
may be involuntary, i.e., a nonowner’s right to be included, or voluntary, i.e., 
an owner’s right to include.39 
1. Involuntary Inclusion 
Several criticisms of the right to exclude focus on competing claims by 
others to use, possess, or enjoy an owner’s property. For example, in Property: 
Values and Institutions, Hanoch Dagan argues against the “trend of exclusion-
centrism in property.”40 In a chapter entitled “Exclusion and Inclusion in 
Property,” Dagan contends that “property neither is nor should be solely about 
exclusion or exclusivity and that, at times, inclusion is part of what property is 
rather than external to its core.”41 Dagan is correct in saying that exclusion is 
not the end of the story. But what Dagan means by “inclusion” is different than 
what this Article means by the right to include. 
Dagan is investigating a nonowner’s right of access, i.e., the right to be 
included.42 He illustrates his argument with examples drawn from public 
accommodations law, fair use in copyright law, and the Fair Housing Act.43 
Each of these examples, like access in general, is a vital topic within property. 
Accordingly, there is a fairly well-developed literature examining situations in 
which a legal rule of exclusion conflicts with a public policy favoring 
inclusion,44 and many examples in which a nonowner’s right to be included 
trumps an owner’s right to exclude. 
 
 39 Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle of Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheers for Merrill and 
Smith, 8 ECON J. WATCH 215, 218 (2011) (“A well-designed private property system . . . must enable many 
forms of consensual, and sometimes even nonconsensual, decomposition.”). 
 40 HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 38 (2011). 
 41 Id. at 48.  
 42 Id. at 44–45 (discussing “The Right to be Included” and “categories of cases where property law 
vindicates the right of nonowners to be included”). 
 43 See id. at 48–54. 
 44 See, e.g., EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, 
PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP (2010); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, 
ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (2000); Alexander, supra note 8; Dagan, supra note 8; Singer, 
supra note 8. 
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As Blackstone himself acknowledges, an owner’s right to exclude is not 
absolute.45 For example, a person may enter upon another’s land based on 
necessity to preserve human life.46 Likewise, hunters have long held a right to 
enter unenclosed lands;47 indeed, a few American states, as well as many 
European nations, recognize a right of access for hunters, and about half the 
states require owners to post signs on the border of their property to exclude 
hunters.48 Commercial airlines fly their planes over millions of parcels,49 even 
though doing so would be a trespass under the ad coelum rule.50 Moreover, in 
two well-known cases on the right to exclude, State v. Shack and PruneYard v. 
Robins, courts privileged the nonowners’ interest in access over the owners’ 
interest in exclusion.51 Plus, public accommodations and antidiscrimination 
law are widely recognized as important limitations on the right to exclude.52 
Similarly, in intellectual property (IP) law, nonowners often assert a right 
to be included. In copyright law, the fair use exception is a limitation on an 
author’s right to exclude others from copying an original work.53 In patent law, 
compulsory licensing is premised on a claim that a potential licensee has the 
 
 45 See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric and Practice of Rights in America, 
98 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 290 (2010) (noting that, “[a]fter describing property rights as exclusive,” Blackstone 
utilizes “five hundred pages describing various situations in which property rights properly yielded to 
community interests”). 
 46 See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908); see also Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 
N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910).  
 47 See, e.g., McConico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244 (1818). 
 48 See Mark R. Sigmon, Note, Hunting and Posting on Private Land in America, 54 DUKE L.J. 549, 558–
64 (2004) (describing current laws regarding hunting on private land); see also Richard M. Hynes, Posted: 
Notice and the Right to Exclude, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 949, 952 n.10, 955–56 (2013).  
 49 See Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 756 (9th Cir. 1936). 
 50 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 13–15. 
 51 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–84 (1980) (holding that a state limitation on a 
shopping mall owner’s right to exclude individuals engaged in political speech did not constitute an 
unconstitutional taking of the owner’s property); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371–72, 374 (N.J. 1971) 
(holding that a health worker and staff attorney, who had entered a farm to speak with migrant workers living 
and working on the farm, did not commit a “trespass” because “ownership of real property does not include the 
right to bar access to governmental services available to migrant workers”). 
 52 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006) (prohibiting “discrimination or segregation in places of public 
accommodation”); id. § 3604 (prohibiting “discrimination in the sale or rental of housing” on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, family status, national origin, as well as disability). On public accommodations, see 
generally A.K. Sandoval-Strausz, Travelers, Strangers, and Jim Crow: Law, Public Accommodations, and 
Civil Rights in America, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 53 (2005); and Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: 
Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996).  
 53 See Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory 
Explanation, 21 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 453, 454–55 (2002); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as 
Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1812 (2007) (“[T]he doctrine of fair 
use is another limitation on copyright.”).  
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right to be included in using a drug or invention.54 More broadly, in advocating 
for an expansion of the public domain, many IP scholars emphasize the rights 
of users to be included.55 
Overall, the right of access is central in many areas of property and IP law. 
Furthermore, several leading property scholars, including Gregory Alexander, 
Hanoch Dagan, and Joseph Singer, outline theories that explain, justify, and 
promote inclusion in this sense.56 However, there are clear differences between 
a nonowner’s right to be included and the owner’s right to include, and these 
differences deserve independent consideration. 
2. Voluntary Inclusion 
Owners often include others in their property. Yet, unlike the right to 
exclude or the right to be included, neither courts nor commentators have 
focused much on the right to include. In delineating the bundle of rights that 
characterizes property, courts have not identified the right to include as a 
distinct attribute of ownership.57 Moreover, in defining property, many 
casebooks do not mention, or only briefly mention, the right to include.58 
Overall, the focus of most courts and commentators is on other attributes of 
property, such as the right to exclude, transfer, possess, or use.59 To date, there 
is no systematic effort to investigate the right to include and its implications. 
 
 54 See, e.g., Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as Measured by Compulsory 
Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 383 & n.72 (2011); Subhasis Saha, Patent Law and TRIPS: Compulsory 
Licensing of Patents and Pharmaceuticals, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 364, 366–67 (2009). 
 55 See, e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF 
USERS’ RIGHTS 14–15 (1991); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints 
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 354, 359 (1999). 
 56 See generally DAGAN, supra note 40, at 44 (“[P]roperty values . . . necessitate the incorporation of 
some dimension of social responsibility into the concept of property . . . .”); SINGER, supra note 44, at 18 
(“[T]here is no core of property we can define that leaves owners free to ignore entirely the interests of 
others.”); Alexander, supra note 8 (proposing a social-obligation theory of property, in which people have an 
obligation to promote human flourishing in their communities, which could extend to an obligation to share). 
 57 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“Property rights 
in a physical thing have been described as the rights ‘to possess, use and dispose of it.’” (quoting United States 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945))); Kafka v. Montana Dept. of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 2008 
MT 460, ¶ 33, 348 Mont. 80, 201 P.3d 8 (defining property as “rights to exclude, use, transfer, or dispose of 
the property” (quoting Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1330 
(Fed. Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 58 See, e.g., JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 4–5 (2d ed. 2007) (“[T]he most 
important sticks in the bundle are: (1) the right to exclude; (2) the right to transfer; and (3) the right to possess 
and use.” (footnote omitted)); see also infra notes 61, 63 (citing casebooks by Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith 
and by Jesse Dukeminier et al., both of which mention an owner’s right to include).  
 59 See supra notes 57–58. 
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Recently, several scholars, while emphasizing the right to exclude as the 
unifying or essential feature of property, have hinted that there may be another, 
related concept just beneath the surface. Specifically, a handful of scholars, 
including Penner, Merrill and Smith, and Merges, emphasize the fact that 
owners have the ability to include others. Penner uses the analogy of the 
gatekeeper to suggest that owners can include as well as exclude: “The right to 
property is like a gate, not a wall.”60 Likewise, Merrill and Smith compare 
owners to gatekeepers in noting that “it is important not only to be able to 
exclude other persons from the thing, but also to be able to include other 
persons in the use and enjoyment of the thing.”61 
Neither Penner nor Merrill and Smith adopt the realist perspective of 
property as a bundle of rights.62 But some realists, including Felix Cohen, also 
hypothesize that property entails not just the ability to exclude but also the 
power to “grant permission” to use something.63 Moreover, several scholars, 
including Robert Ellickson, have argued that one of the virtues of the “bundle 
of rights” or “bundle of sticks” metaphor is that it highlights “an owner’s 
powers to transfer particular sticks in a bundle” and thereby include others.64 
This idea of inclusion arises in intellectual, as well as real, property. 
Merges contends that analyzing “a typical property right (including especially 
most IP rights) reveals all sorts of ways that the supposedly exclusive right of 
property is actually bound up with various forms of inclusion.”65 Merges 
describes inclusion as not enforcing or waiving IP rights.66 For example, if a 
firm owns a patent that is being infringed, the firm can decide not to enforce its 
patent. Similarly, if a firm wants to provide life-saving drugs to individuals in a 
developing nation, the firm can waive its IP rights. Merges advocates a “robust 
‘right to include,’” which he says is “coextensive with the traditional right to 
 
 60 PENNER, supra note 4, at 74. 
 61 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 449; see also Merrill, supra note 29, at 742–44; Henry E. Smith, 
Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1710 (2012). 
 62 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 360; Penner, supra note 24, at 714–15; see also Ellickson, 
supra note 39, at 216 (describing Merrill and Smith as “the leading critics of the bundle metaphor”). 
 63 See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 372 (1954) (“Without 
freedom to bar one man from a certain activity and to allow another man to engage in that activity we would 
have no property.”); see also JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 88 (7th ed. 2010) (describing Cohen’s idea 
of property as “a relationship among people that entitles so-called owners to include (that is, permit) or exclude 
(that is, deny) use or possession of the owned property by other people”). 
 64 Ellickson, supra note 39, at 218 & n.4; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual 
Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 464 (2010). 
 65 MERGES, supra note 2, at 295. 
 66 See id. at 286, 295. 
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exclude at the heart of IP and property generally.”67 He concludes that this 
“ability to easily include is an important flip side to the grant of property 
rights.”68 
However, except for brief treatments by Penner, Merrill and Smith, and 
Merges, the property theory literature has not focused much on an owner’s 
right to include others. Moreover, the literature on the economic analysis of 
property has not investigated the social advantages and disadvantages of 
dividing property rights, with a few notable exceptions.69 Instead, most 
scholars have focused almost exclusively on the costs, rather than the benefits, 
of fragmentation.70 Yet, as Part II suggests, the benefits of inclusion are an 
important, albeit underexplored, dimension of property. 
II. ON THE SOCIAL DESIRABILITY OF INCLUSION 
To illustrate why inclusion is socially beneficial, consider a thought 
experiment. Imagine a world in which (a) you cannot include others in the use, 
possession, or enjoyment of your property and (b) others cannot include you in 
their property. Such a world—atomistic, isolated, and exclusive—differs 
dramatically from the interrelated and inclusive world in which we live, work, 
 
 67 Id. at 290–91. 
 68 Id. at 296.  
 69 See generally SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 27–32 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of 
property division); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate 
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1029 (1995) (arguing that “[d]ividing a legal entitlement between 
rivalrous users can facilitate efficient trade”); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Decomposition of Property Rights, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 32 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) 
(summarizing literature on the division of property into less than full ownership interests). In a forthcoming 
work, I discuss under what circumstances an owner’s private incentive to divide property diverges from the 
socially optimal division. See Daniel B. Kelly, Dividing Possessory Rights, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
POSSESSION (Yun-Chien Chang ed., forthcoming 2014).  
 70 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, 
STOPS INNOVATION AND COSTS LIVES, at xvi (2008); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: 
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 623–26 (1998); Michael A. Heller 
& Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 
SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998); see also Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595, 595–96 
(2002); Francesco Parisi, Freedom of Contract and the Laws of Entropy, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 65, 65 
(2003). Excessive fragmentation is a particularly salient issue in the wake of the mortgage crisis. See, e.g., 
David A. Dana, The Foreclosure Crisis and the Antifragmentation Principle in State Property Law, 77 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 97, 97 (2010); Note, The Perils of Fragmentation and Reckless Innovation, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1799, 
1800 (2012).  
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and play. Inclusion is critical because human beings depend upon each other, 
not only to survive but also to flourish.71 
Yet an owner’s decision about whether to include another party entails a 
dilemma. Although inclusion can be highly beneficial, it creates a danger of 
strategic behavior and conflicts over use. How to maximize the benefits of 
inclusion, while minimizing its potential costs, is the key to unlocking the 
dilemma. To this end, Part II.A examines the benefits of inclusion, including 
sharing, exchange, financing, risk-spreading, and specialization. Part II.B 
analyzes some of the primary costs of inclusion: coordination disputes, 
strategic behavior, and conflicts over use. 
A. Social Benefits of Inclusion 
1. Sharing 
Most individuals or families, in ancient as well as modern times, own 
relatively little property. Inclusion can therefore emerge out of necessity, e.g., 
obtaining permission to hunt on another’s land,72 renting a field to grow 
crops,73 or sharing subsistence harvests.74 Inclusion through sharing is 
ubiquitous across cultures. Anthropologists and ethnographers have 
documented the role that “hosting” (i.e., inviting others into one’s home) plays 
all over the world and throughout history.75 
Similarly, a recent article entitled “Is Civilization the Result of Humans’ 
Need to Share?,” reports on how a study in Science “shows that young human 
children perform as well as apes on intelligence tests, but that kids beat apes in 
 
 71 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN 
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970, at 1–2 (1997) (characterizing human persons as “inevitably 
dependent on others not only to thrive but even just to survive”); Penner, supra note 5, at 185 (“Humans, qua 
humans, depend upon co-operative activity to survive as a matter of their very nature . . . .”). 
 72 See Sigmon, supra note 48, at 552–58. 
 73 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 649. 
 74 See, e.g., Hannah B. Loon, Sharing: You Are Never Alone in a Village, ALASKA FISH & GAME, Nov.–
Dec. 1989, at 34, 36 (discussing various kinds of equitable, charitable, and ceremonial sharing of subsistence 
harvests in Inupiaq Eskimo villages). 
 75 See, e.g., Harumi Befu, An Ethnography of Dinner Entertainment in Japan, 11 ARCTIC 
ANTHROPOLOGY (SUPPLEMENT) 196 (1974) (discussing the rituals that accompany hosting dinner guests); 
Russell Zanca, “Take! Take! Take!” Host–Guest Relations and All That Food: Uzbek Hospitality Past and 
Present, ANTHROPOLOGY E. EUR. REV., Spring 2003, at 8; see also ADAM YUET CHAU, MIRACULOUS 
RESPONSE: DOING POPULAR RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 126 (2006) (“Hosting is arguably the most 
important social activity for Shaanbei people.”).  
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social skills.”76 The article speculates that “this human need to voluntarily 
share is why we have language” and also may “explain blogs, YouTube, and 
social networking.”77 Indeed, in recent years, many people have participated in 
the “sharing economy,” in which renters use the Internet to connect with 
owners who are renting their spare rooms (on Airbnb), cars (on RelayRides), 
or other assets that are being less than fully utilized.78 Finally, as economists 
have pointed out, sharing can be the result of either self-interest or altruism.79 
For example, even a profit-maximizing firm may share its resources with 
developing countries by waiving IP rights to life-saving drugs.80 
Sharing is socially beneficial if the benefits to a donor and donee outweigh 
the social costs. However, the private incentive to share may diverge from the 
socially optimal level of sharing because, even if donors are altruistic and 
benefit from an increase in the happiness of donees, donors may not take into 
account that this benefit to donees is itself relevant to social welfare.81 As a 
result, unless a donor’s motivation is to maximize social welfare, rather than 
the donor’s own self-interest, the private incentive to include others for 
purposes of sharing may diverge from what is socially optimal.82 
 
 76 Christie Nicholson, Is Civilization the Result of Humans’ Need to Share?, SCI. AM. (May 27, 2008), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode.cfm?id=2BA90A6B-C679-1D75-05835D9B22FE24FC 
(discussing Esther Hermann et al., Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural 
Intelligence Hypothesis, 317 SCIENCE 1360 (2007)). 
 77 Id. 
 78 The Rise of the Sharing Economy: On the Internet, Everything Is for Hire, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2013, 
at 53. See generally RACHEL BOSTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF 
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010).  
 79 On self-interested or “warm-glow” giving, see generally SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 58 (“[T]he act of 
giving itself may supply utility to the donor, independently of the degree of satisfaction it renders the donee.”). 
James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 
ECON. J. 464 (1990) (describing utility from giving itself as a “warm glow”). On altruistic giving, see generally 
Joseph G. Altonji et al., Parental Altruism and Inter Vivos Transfers: Theory and Evidence, 105 J. POL. ECON. 
1121, 1122 (1997) (“Two motives compete to explain family exchange: altruism and self-interest.”); Steven 
Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1991) (discussing 
economic rationale motivating donors and deferred giving).  
 80 See, e.g., Sarah Boseley, Glaxo Offers Free Access to Potential Malaria Cures, GUARDIAN (U.K.), 
Jan. 20, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/science/2010/jan/20/glaxo-malaria-drugs-public-domain; Russell 
Williams, Editorial, Drug Firms Proud of Their Work Globally, TORONTO STAR, July 29, 2009, at A18. See 
generally M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 571 (2009) (discussing corporate philanthropy and examining the role that corporations 
should play in satisfying the demand for altruism). 
 81 See Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. PUB. ECON. 469, 469–70 (1995) (discussing 
positive externality in giving). 
 82 See id. 
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2. Exchange 
Unlike sharing, which entails a gratuitous transfer, exchange entails a 
transfer with consideration. Exchange is fundamental to a market economy 
because, through voluntary agreements, resources move from low-value to 
high-value users.83 The future exchange of goods and services requires 
contracts. Thus, A agrees to a contract with B, and B agrees to a contract with 
A, only if A and B believe they will benefit from their agreement.84 
Consider several types of exchange, each of which entails inclusion. In a 
residential lease, a landlord remains the owner of an apartment but transfers 
possession of the apartment to a tenant. The landlord benefits from receiving 
the rent; the tenant benefits from having a place to live.85 By selling tickets, 
i.e., revocable licenses, the owner of a stadium permits spectators to enter the 
arena. The owner benefits from selling the tickets; fans pay for a chance to 
watch the concert or game.86 Finally, in an IP licensing agreement, a firm 
maintains ownership of its IP rights but allows consumers or other firms to use 
the information or idea.87 The firm obtains a licensing fee; the licensees benefit 
from having access to the intellectual property rights.88 
In short, the exchange function of inclusion allows parties to enter into 
various kinds of mutually beneficial agreements regarding property without 
requiring complete alienation. Of course, if the law did not enforce such 
agreements, parties might engage in fewer exchanges. Moreover, exchange is a 
 
 83 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 39 (8th ed. 2011); see also Benjamin E. 
Hermalin, Avery E. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra 
note 14, at 3, 7 (“The essence of a free-market economy is the ability of private parties to enter into voluntary 
agreements that govern the economic exchange between them.”). 
 84 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 2 (1979); 
see also SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 296 (discussing “the mutual desirability of a contract”).  
 85 See Ellickson, supra note 16, at 1372; cf. Louis De Alessi, Gains from Private Property: The 
Empirical Evidence, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 90, 102 (Terry L. Anderson & 
Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003) (“Voluntary renting and leasing are prevalent usufruct arrangements that 
facilitate the bundling of resource rights and their flow to higher-valued users.”). 
 86 A study estimates that over 277 million tickets were sold in the United States in 2005 for professional 
sports events and NCAA football and men’s basketball games. See Brad R. Humphreys & Jane E. Ruseski, 
Estimates of the Dimensions of the Sports Market in the US, 4 INT’L J. OF SPORT FIN. 94, 100–01 (2009).  
 87 See WILLIAM E. O’BRIEN ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING AGREEMENTS § 2, at 2 (2d ed. 
2012) (“A license is defined as a grant of rights by an owner of intellectual property to use, make, have made, 
or sell the owner’s intellectual property.”). 
 88 See id. (“A license agreement enables the owner and licensor to share technology or intellectual 
property with a licensee in exchange for compensation while retaining and controlling ownership of the 
licensed materials.”). 
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broad term that includes several types of mutually beneficial activities, 
including financing, risk-sharing, and specialization. 
3. Financing 
Financing is also instrumental in a market economy. One method of 
financing is a loan from a lender to a borrower. The borrower obtains the loan 
and, in return, promises to repay the lender (usually, with interest). The 
borrower may pledge collateral as security against the debt. A security interest, 
including a mortgage, is itself a type of inclusion.89 But other forms of 
inclusion also serve this financing function. 
Historically, leases served as a financing device. In discussing ancient land 
law, Robert Ellickson and Charles Thorland point out that “[a]nthropological 
evidence indicates that members of preindustrial societies tend to engage in 
land-leasing at an earlier stage than land-selling.”90 Ellickson and Thorland 
maintain that “[r]ental arrangements respond to land-occupancy demands of 
relatively transitory or capital-poor persons.”91 Likewise, as Edward Glaeser 
and others have documented, the lease was a way of circumventing the 
prohibition on usury.92 Indeed, before the emergence of capital markets, leases 
served as a financing device for farmers93 as well as early entrepreneurs.94 
Similarly, today’s consumers, especially consumers with few assets or poor 
credit, may prefer to lease, rather than buy, property for the sake of financing.95 
 
 89 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 808 (“Security interests can be seen as another form of divided 
ownership.”). On security interests in property law, see generally Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy as Property Law, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 206 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 
2011), discussing how claims against assets in bankruptcy implicate property law. 
 90 Robert C. Ellickson & Charles DiA. Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 369 (1995) (citing FREDERIC L. PRYOR, THE ORIGINS OF THE ECONOMY: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DISTRIBUTION IN PRIMITIVE AND PEASANT ECONOMIES 143 (1977)). 
 91 Id.; see also Arthur R. Gaudio, Wyoming’s Residential Rental Property Act—A Critical Review, 35 
LAND & WATER L. REV. 455, 458 (2000) (“One of the initial uses of the leasehold estate was as a financing 
device for persons in need of funds.”). 
 92 See Edward L. Glaeser & José Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be: An Economic 
Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41 J.L. & ECON. 1, 25 (1998); see also MERRILL & SMITH, 
supra note 4, at 648; Mary B. Spector, Tenants’ Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction and the 
Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 142 (2000).  
 93 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 649. 
 94 See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 572−73 (5th ed. 1956); 
Gaudio, supra note 91, at 458. 
 95 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 649; see also Spector, supra note 92, at 144 n.21 (“[P]arties 
negotiate leases as a means of obtaining financing . . . .”). 
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Several types of leases, including ground leases and sale-leasebacks, are well-
established financing devices.96 Likewise, if a person needs a new car, the 
person can buy the car (and finance the purchase with a loan) or, alternatively, 
lease the car.97 The lease is also a common device for financing the purchase of 
aircraft.98 
Other forms of inclusion also serve as financing devices. Licenses are 
instrumental in financing various types of intellectual property rights, 
including rights in motion pictures.99 Mortgage trusts are “a useful mechanism 
for real estate financing,” and, “[w]ithout [such] trusts, it would be impossible 
to explain the expansion of the U.S. housing market after World War II.”100 
Partnerships also facilitate financing and can sometimes serve as an alternative 
to a secured loan.101 
4. Risk-Spreading 
Inclusion also enables both owners and nonowners to reduce certain types 
of risk. Spreading risk is socially beneficial if parties are risk averse. Parties 
may attempt to mitigate their exposure to risk in various ways, including 
diversification and insurance.102 Yet another mechanism for mitigating risk is 
inclusion. 
 
 96 See Gregory M. Stein, Mortgage Law in China: Comparing Theory and Practice, 72 MO. L. REV. 
1315, 1332 (2007) (describing how the ground lease “functions as a financing device”); see generally Marvin 
Milich, The Real Estate Sale-Leaseback Transaction: A View Toward the 90s, 21 REAL EST. L.J. 66 (1992) 
(exploring the advantages and disadvantages of the sale-leaseback as a financing device). 
 97 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 650 (“Auto leasing . . . is clearly a financing device, and 
functions as a substitute for purchasing an auto with a loan secured by a lien on the auto.”). 
 98 See Michael Downey Rice, Current Issues in Aircraft Finance, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 1027, 1032 (1991) 
(“Lease financing of aircraft is often viewed as the alternative to ‘straight’ debt financing.”). 
 99 See, e.g., Lorin Brennan, Financing Intellectual Property Under Revised Article 9: National and 
International Conflicts, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 313, 444 (2001) (explaining that the financing of 
motion pictures “illustrates prototypical intellectual property financing, with tiers of exclusive and non-
exclusive licenses”).  
 100 Dante Figueroa, Civil Law Trusts in Latin America: Is the Lack of Trusts an Impediment for 
Expanding Business Opportunities in Latin America?, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 701, 750 (2007) 
(describing mortgage trusts). 
 101 See generally Robert H. Scarborough, Partnerships as an Alternative to Secured Loans, 58 TAX LAW. 
509, 512 (2005) (“analyz[ing] current law treatment of partnership structures resembling secured financings”); 
see also Glaeser & Scheinkman, supra note 92, at 25 (discussing a “number of subtle mechanisms used . . . to 
avoid the usury ban” including limited partnerships).  
 102 On the role of diversification, see HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT 
DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS 5 (2d ed. 1991). On the role of insurance, see GEORGE E. REJDA, 
PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 20 (11th ed. 2011). 
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The risk-sharing function of inclusion is not a modern phenomenon. 
Ellickson and Thorland posit that another reason that members of preindustrial 
societies may have engaged in land leases, even prior to land sales, is that 
leases serve to spread risks.103 They point out that one of the “two principal 
theories for the widespread use of sharecropping throughout human history” is 
that “its risk-splitting feature appeals to cultivators, who are assumed to be 
more risk-averse than landlords.”104 Indeed, in a seminal contribution to the 
economic analysis of law, The Theory of Share Tenancy, Steven Cheung 
describes sharecropping as a risk-sharing device.105 
Today, many forms of property mitigate risk. Several types of leases serve 
as risk-spreading devices, including residential leases,106 oil and gas leases,107 
and leases on state trust lands.108 Likewise, as Henry Hansmann contends, 
condominiums may have surpassed cooperatives in part because condos are a 
superior device for sharing risk.109 Overall, inclusion allows certain risk-averse 
parties to use, possess, and enjoy property while bearing less risk. 
5. Specialization 
Inclusion is also ubiquitous because of the advantages of specialization.110 
A landlord manages an apartment complex on behalf of tenants; a trustee 
manages funds for beneficiaries; and a CEO manages corporate assets on 
behalf of shareholders. An owner’s inclusion of a nonowner may benefit both 
parties because each party is able to utilize her own strengths and capabilities. 
Many property forms, including leases, condos, trusts, and corporations, 
entail specialization. In leasing an apartment or office, tenants “specialize in 
possession and operation of discrete units within the larger complex,” while 
 
 103 See Ellickson & Thorland, supra note 90, at 369 (citing J.V. Henderson & Y.M. Ioannides, A Model of 
Housing Tenure Choice, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 98 (1983)). 
 104 Id. at 371. 
 105 STEVEN N.S. CHEUNG, THE THEORY OF SHARE TENANCY 68 (1969). But cf. DOUGLAS W. ALLEN & 
DEAN LUECK, THE NATURE OF THE FARM: CONTRACTS, RISK, AND ORGANIZATION IN AGRICULTURE 10 (2002) 
(finding little support for risk-spreading theory). 
 106 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 649 (describing how leasing reduces risk for both tenants and 
landlords). 
 107 See, e.g., Comm’r v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 219 n.17 (1984) (noting that “lessees can spread their risks 
over many leased properties”). 
 108 See, e.g., JON A. SOUDER & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST LANDS: HISTORY, MANAGEMENT, AND 
SUSTAINABLE USE 71–77 (1996) (discussing “leasing as a mechanism for managing and apportioning risk”). 
 109 See Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax 
Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 60 (1991). 
 110 See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 51 (2d ed. 1997). 
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the landlord is responsible for “constructing, maintaining, insuring, and 
coordinating assets common to the entire complex.”111 Likewise, condos are 
popular in part because residents own their individual units and hire managers 
to supervise the complex and maintain common areas.112 Trusts, by providing 
managerial intermediation, exemplify the benefits of specialization: 
beneficiaries enjoy distributions of income and principal, while the trustee is 
responsible for managing and investing the trust corpus.113 Finally, in a 
corporation, shareholders bear the benefits and burdens of ownership, while 
the directors and managers operate the firm on a daily basis.114 
Overall, many property forms promote specialization through inclusion.115 
In discussing the benefits of divided ownership, Yoram Barzel notes how “sole 
ownership may result in yet a greater loss due to reduced specialization.”116 
And specialization is often advantageous for owners and nonowners alike. 
* * * 
Including others is often beneficial because different parties derive benefits 
from different aspects of the property. Sharing enables donative transfers 
without requiring the transfer of ownership (e.g., waiving IP rights over a life-
saving drug or creating a trust to support a surviving spouse). Exchange 
facilitates mutually beneficial agreements regarding the use or possession of 
property without complete alienation (e.g., licensing software). Financing 
 
 111 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 650; see also Victor P. Goldberg et al., Bargaining in the Shadow 
of Eminent Domain: Valuing and Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between Landlord and Tenant, 34 
UCLA L. REV. 1083, 1095 (1987) (“Leasing is economically beneficial because it permits specialization of 
functions.”); Lueck & Miceli, supra note 14, at 217 (“A lease . . . can enhance efficiency by allowing gains 
from specialization.”). 
 112 See Jonathan D. Ross-Harrington, Note, Property Forms in Tension: Preference Inefficiency, Rent-
Seeking, and the Problem of Notice in the Modern Condominium, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 196 (2009) 
(“[C]ondominiums create efficiencies by allowing for specialization in management . . . .”). 
 113 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 579 (9th ed. 2013); 
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 779. 
 114 See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
4–6 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932); see also Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and 
Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 261–65 (1967) (discussing efficiency of specialization in the corporate form). 
 115 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 646, 649–50, 778–79, 805–06 (explaining that leases, trusts, 
corporations, and partnerships “permit the management of resources to be separated from their use and 
enjoyment” and promote the “specialization of functions”). 
 116 BARZEL, supra note 110, at 55; see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of 
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301–02 (1983) (presenting a model in which division of 
ownership and control is an efficient specialization of functions); Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: 
Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1173 (2003) (“Divided property rights in assets can be 
used to facilitate specialization in production or consumption.”). 
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allows a party to obtain access to property without purchasing it (e.g., leasing 
rather than buying a car). Risk-spreading allows nonowners, as well as owners, 
to share risks (e.g., renting an apartment for what could be a short-term move). 
Finally, specialization allows parties to maximize their joint gains by 
performing distinct roles or functions (e.g., having one party manage a trust for 
a fee while another party enjoys the income from the trust). 
B. Social Costs of Inclusion 
If contracts were complete or property rights could be perfectly specified 
and enforced, inclusion would be straightforward. But ex ante specification is 
difficult for several reasons.117 Because contracts are incomplete and property 
rights are imperfect,118 inclusion entails a number of potential issues, including 
(1) coordination difficulties, (2) strategic behavior, and (3) conflicts over use. 
 
 117 First, it is difficult to foresee all potential contingences. See Hermalin et al., supra note 83, at 75 
(discussing the idea that, because of bounded rationality, individuals “fail to foresee all possible contingencies 
and, thus, their contracts suffer from unforeseen contingencies”). Second, even if foreseeable, it is costly for 
the parties to specify additional terms. See id. at 76–77; see also SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 299 (“[P]arties 
will tend not to specify terms of low probability events . . . .”). Third, in defining the scope of inclusion, parties 
may be unable to observe whether they share a common understanding of certain terms or conditions. See 
Hermalin et al., supra note 83, at 78–79 (discussing asymmetric information and the problem of observability). 
Fourth, even if the parties have the same understanding, either party may act opportunistically, and it is costly 
for the parties to rely on courts or other enforcement mechanisms to verify compliance. See id. at 79 
(discussing the problem of verifiability); see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, 
and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S382 
(2002) (“[I]f the parties solve the coordination problem, each needs assurance that the other will not 
opportunistically assert rights that properly belong to the other.”).  
 118 On incomplete contracts, see SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 299–301; and Hermalin et al., supra note 83, 
at 75–80. See generally OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995) (arguing that 
the existence of incomplete contracts and ex post opportunism help to explain many economic institutions and 
arrangements); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 691 (1986) (“When it is costly to list all specific rights 
over assets in the contract, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights. . . . [T]his inevitably 
creates distortions.”); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 
115 (1999) (attempting to provide a foundation for the idea of “incomplete contracting”). On imperfect 
specification and enforcement of property rights, see Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Land 
Property Rights and Resource Allocation, 54 J.L. & ECON. S329, S330 (2011) (citing BARZEL, supra note 
110), noting that “creating, specifying, and enforcing property rights is costly and, hence, these rights will 
never be perfect.” Cf. Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 9 (Oct. 22, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/HSmith_LawVersusEquity7.pdf 
(suggesting that “opportunism is behavior that is undesirable but that cannot be cost-effectively captured—
defined, detected, and deterred—by explicit ex ante rulemaking”). 
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1. Coordination Difficulties 
If a single party, A, owns property, in fee simple absolute, there is little or 
no difficulty in coordinating how to use the property. A can use her property in 
whatever way, and to whatever extent, she believes to be best (assuming the 
use does not constitute a nuisance or violate a covenant or zoning ordinance). 
If A wants to go for a swim in her pool, then A can do so. As long as she does 
not schedule two events on her property at the same time, there is no 
possibility of conflict. 
However, suppose that A decides to divide her property by including 
another party, B. Now A and B must coordinate how to use the property. For 
example, B may have a limited right to use the property for a certain purpose 
(as in a license or easement), with A retaining the right to use it for all other 
purposes. Or B may have the right to possess the property for a limited period 
of time (as in a lease or bailment), with A reserving the right to retake 
possession when B’s interest ends. A division of rights also could entail A and 
B using the property at the same time or in close proximity. In each situation 
involving more than one party, there is a higher likelihood that disputes will 
arise because of coordination difficulties. Put another way, multiple parties 
may want to use the swimming pool at the same time.119 
2. Strategic Behavior 
Coordination problems can be exacerbated by the possibility of strategic 
behavior. Including others creates a risk for many types of opportunism.120 An 
owner may want to include another for one purpose, but it may be difficult for 
the owner to limit access for this particular purpose. For instance, a party who 
is being included may seek to expand the scope of the inclusion. Or, other 
parties may attempt to expand the inclusion by using the property for the 
authorized purpose. If the expected costs of inclusion become too high, owners 
may decide not to include others at the outset. 
 
 119 See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 29 (“If many individuals have the right to use a person’s backyard 
swimming pool at different times, the odds of different people wishing to use the pool simultaneously will 
increase.”). 
 120 Oliver Williamson defines opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile.” OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47 (1985). 
Williamson describes “guile” broadly to include “calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or 
otherwise confuse,” as well as incomplete disclosure of information. Id.; see also Oliver E. Williamson, 
Opportunistic Behaviour in Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 
703, 703 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). I use “strategic behavior” and “opportunism” interchangeably.  
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Consider two examples that illustrate the problem of opportunism in the 
context of inclusion. A homeowner, H, may be willing to grant a neighbor, N, 
an easement over H’s land to provide N with access to a beach for swimming 
and boating.121 But, once included, N may increase the intensity of use, number 
of authorized uses, or scope of the easement.122 For example, N may use the 
easement not only for swimming and boating but also for having a picnic.123 
Similarly, a patent owner, P, may seek to license a patent to a firm, F, for a 
new smartphone.124 Yet, once included, F may attempt to increase the scope of 
the license.125 Anticipating strategic behavior, owners, such as H and P, may 
be less willing to include nonowners, such as N and F, at the outset.  
Of course, opportunism is a two-way street: owners, like nonowners, may 
act strategically. For example, a patent troll owns a property interest solely for 
the purpose of inclusion because the troll is only able to monetize its interest 
through strategic licensing agreements. In this case, nonowners may choose to 
forgo an otherwise beneficial inclusion. 
Overall, opportunism is problematic for several reasons. First, fearing 
strategic behavior, there is less incentive for owners to include others or for 
nonowners to seek to be included and, thus, a lower likelihood of sharing or 
exchange. Second, even if including others is feasible, parties often will incur 
additional costs in specifying the terms of inclusion. Third, opportunism may 
result in monitoring costs, especially if a nonowner is acting as an agent (e.g., a 
trustee or manager) on behalf of the owner, the principal (e.g., the settlor or 
shareholders).126 The possibility of strategic behavior is thus a significant cost 
of inclusion and may impede certain transfers that involve including others.127 
 
 121 See, e.g., Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass’n v. Cool, 86 P.3d 484, 486 (Idaho 2004) (describing 
an easement for “use of the beach area . . . for swimming and boating only” (internal quotation mark omitted)).  
 122 See Lee J. Strang, Damages as the Appropriate Remedy for “Abuse” of an Easement: Moving Toward 
Consistency, Efficiency, and Fairness in Property Law, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 933, 935−36 (2008). 
 123 See Mountainview Landowners, 86 P.3d at 488 (“Picnics and gatherings for relaxation and social 
interaction would not under any stretch be swimming.”). 
 124 See, e.g., Dan Levine & Edwin Chan, Apple Expert Shines Light on Samsung Sales in U.S., REUTERS 
(Aug. 13, 2012, 2:34 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/14/us-apple-samsung-idUSBRE87C0SC20 
120814 (reporting that “an Apple executive testified that the company had licensed prized design patents to 
Microsoft”). 
 125 See Dan Levine & Poornima Gupta, Apple, Samsung Launch Salvos as Smartphone Trial Heats Up, 
REUTERS (July 31, 2012, 7:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/31/us-apple-samsung-trial-
idUSBRE86Q16X20120731 (“Apple sued Samsung in . . . federal court, accusing the South Korean company 
of slavishly copying the iPhone and iPad.”).  
 126 A corporate manager may not have the same interests as the shareholders. See Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
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3. Conflicts over Use 
A related difficulty with inclusion is the potential for conflicts over use. 
Because a nonowner may have a shorter time horizon than an owner with 
respect to the property, the nonowner may discount the future utility of the 
property.128 As a result, the nonowner may engage in actions—such as 
imposing excessive wear-and-tear—that do not maximize the property’s value 
in the long run.129 For the same reason, a nonowner’s private incentive to 
maintain or improve the property may diverge from what is socially optimal.130 
As a result, a nonowner may engage in actions—such as not maintaining the 
property—that result in a decline in the asset’s value. 
Consider the classic example of a landlord and tenant. A tenant will take 
actions that affect the property’s future value.131 But the tenant does not bear 
the full costs or benefits of using or maintaining the property. Consequently, 
the tenant may use the property excessively or maintain the property 
inadequately.132 For instance, in an agricultural lease, the owner of the land 
may worry that a tenant farmer will ignore the long-term sustainability of the 
field.133 In a residential lease, the landlord may fear that a tenant will ignore a 
minor problem (e.g., a leaky faucet), resulting in a more serious problem in the 
future (e.g., flooding).134 Likewise, a rental car company may limit the number 
of miles but is usually unable to prevent excessive wear-and-tear on the brakes 
 
FIN. ECON. 305, 308–09 (1976). A trustee may not have the same interests as the settlor. See Robert H. Sitkoff, 
An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 621 (2004).  
 127 Cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 117, at S382−83 (stating that the potential for opportunism 
may decrease the value of rights as “parties may take costly private actions to protect their rights; investments 
in improving and using assets may be discouraged; privately borne risk may increase; and transactions that 
would otherwise take place may not occur”).  
 128 See POSNER, supra note 83, at 90. 
 129 See id. at 90−92 (discussing divided ownership in estates in land); SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 79 
(discussing externalities in the treatment of rental property).  
 130 See Lueck & Miceli, supra note 14, at 217 (“The division of ownership and use . . . creates potential 
incentive problems for both landlords and tenants regarding the optimal maintenance and use of the 
property.”). 
 131 See POSNER, supra note 83, at 90–91; SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 79. 
 132 See Lueck & Miceli, supra note 14, at 217. 
 133 See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 79 (“When a person rents farmland, he may reduce its usefulness by 
abusing it, letting it erode, and so forth . . . .”); Lueck & Miceli, supra note 14, at 218 (developing a model in 
which, given a fixed rent, landlord and tenant “under invest in maintenance”). 
 134 Cf. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“A tenant’s tenure in a 
specific apartment will often not be sufficient to justify efforts at repairs.”); Davidow v. Inwood N. Prof’l 
Grp.—Phase I, 747 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. 1988) (“[B]ecause commercial tenants often enter into short-term 
leases, the tenants have limited economic incentive to make any extensive repairs to their premises.”).  
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or upholstery.135 In a similar way, the interests of licensors and licensees, 
settlors and trustees, and shareholders and directors may diverge as well. 
Thus, although the actions of nonowners may affect the future value of the 
property, nonowners may not have an incentive to internalize the full costs of 
their actions. Owners can take measures to mitigate the problem.136 However, 
such measures are usually imperfect and costly. As a result, owners will have 
an incentive to include others less often than if the interests of the parties were 
aligned. And, once again, the problem is reciprocal: there is a risk that owners, 
as well as nonowners, may engage in this type of behavior.137 
III.  COMPETING MODES OF INCLUSION 
To maximize the net benefits of inclusion, the law authorizes multiple ways 
of including others, including informal, contractual, and proprietary inclusion. 
Part III.A discusses informal inclusion through nonenforcement and waiver. 
Part III.B analyzes inclusion via contract, compares informal and contractual 
inclusion, and identifies certain limitations of contract in deterring 
opportunism. Part III.C considers inclusion through well-recognized forms of 
property. After examining the functional justifications for distinguishing 
between these property forms and contracts, I compare several forms of 
property that facilitate inclusion. 
A. Informal Inclusion 
Informal inclusion involves situations in which an owner includes another 
in property, but the inclusion imposes no legal obligations on the parties. 
Unlike formal inclusion, which relies on contract or property law, informal 
inclusion relies on an owner’s discretion and social norms to govern the scope, 
terms, and termination of the inclusion. This Article discusses two types of 
informal inclusion: nonenforcement and waiver. 
 
 135 See POSNER, supra note 83, at 94; SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 79. The impediments to monitoring 
driver behavior are sometimes legal, not economic or technological. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Yen, Rent a Car, 
Rent a Spy, BUS. L. TODAY, July/Aug. 2005, at 59, 59. On rental car agreements, see generally Irma S. Russell, 
Got Wheels? Article 2A, Standardized Rental Car Terms, Rational Inaction, and Unilateral Private Ordering, 
40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 137 (2006), studying the form contracts of ten rental car companies. 
 136 See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 17.  
 137 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 63, at 482 (discussing how tenants have an incentive to “neglect 
maintenance” and landlords have an incentive to “neglect everyday repairs”). 
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As noted above, Robert Merges discusses how owners can include others 
by not enforcing property rights.138 Merges highlights the “crucial postgrant 
stage in the life of a typical property right.”139 He argues that attending to this 
stage “reveals all sorts of ways that the supposedly exclusive right of property 
is actually bound up with various forms of inclusion.”140 “The most obvious 
example,” according to Merges, is “nonenforcement” because “rights that are 
theoretically exclusive can be voluntarily left idle for all sorts of reasons—
rendering them not very exclusive at all.”141 
Nonenforcement (e.g., not ejecting a trespasser or not filing a claim against 
a patent or copyright infringer) is distinct from other types of inclusion. First, 
nonenforcement is passive. Unlike a gratuitous license or a lease, an owner 
who includes through nonenforcement does not have to take any affirmative 
steps.142 Second, nonenforcement is ex post. Unlike a waiver that is given in 
advance, the decision not to exclude a nonowner usually occurs, or is made 
evident, after the nonowner begins to use the owner’s property.143 Third, unlike 
contracts or property forms, nonenforcement does not create new rights or 
duties. In other words, nonenforcement functions as an implicit waiver of the 
right to exclude after the fact. 
The problem with nonenforcement is that it provides little certainty. The 
nonowner is able to use the property only under a continual risk of losing 
access. At any time, the owner may decide to exclude.144 With a few 
exceptions like estoppel, laches, and adverse possession, the law does not 
provide a nonowner with any legal rights or remedies. Of course, social norms 
and other factors may affect the circumstances in which the owner decides to 
terminate the inclusion.145 But, ultimately, the decision not to enforce is within 
the owner’s discretion. An owner may decide to exclude at any time or for any 
 
 138 See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 139 MERGES, supra note 2, at 295. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id.; see also Robert P. Merges, Autonomy and Independence: The Normative Face of Transaction 
Costs, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 145, 161 n.22 (2011) (collecting sources regarding “empirical evidence on extensive 
underenforcement of patents in biotechnology” and “extensive nonenforcement of copyrights in the online 
context”). 
 142 See MERGES, supra note 2, at 295. 
 143 See id. 
 144 See id.  
 145 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1095 (2008) (discussing the social norms 
governing the “nonenforcement of patents”). 
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reason, even if opportunistic.146 Moreover, a nonowner may have an incentive 
to expand the scope of the inclusion and to use property excessively, especially 
knowing that the owner can revoke at any time. Thus, nonenforcement may 
provide little protection against strategic behavior. 
Another type of informal inclusion is waiver. An owner can include a 
nonowner in her property by gratuitously waiving the right to exclude.147 A 
waiver of the right to exclude is a “permission slip” from the owner to a 
nonowner.148 The waiver may be explicit (e.g., an invitation) or implicit (e.g., a 
store opening its doors).149 Yet, unlike nonenforcement, which entails an 
owner’s decision not to enforce after the fact, a waiver entails a decision to 
include before the fact—essentially, a promise in advance not to exclude. 
Including others through waiver is pervasive.150 A common type of waiver 
is a gratuitous license.151 A gratuitous license involves a waiver of the right to 
exclude, converting what would otherwise be a trespass into a lawful entry 
upon or use of the owner’s property.152 Another example is the waiver of IP 
rights in life-saving drugs.153 Because waiver is consistent with several of the 
 
 146 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Response, Individual Creators in the Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 793, 804 (2010) (describing companies that withhold patent information from standard-setting 
organizations of which they are a part, and stating that “the strategic use of patents here has the potential to do 
real economic harm”). 
 147 See MERGES, supra note 2, at 295. 
 148 Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 976 (2000) (“A 
license is a ‘permission slip’ from someone with the right to exclude that allows another to gain access to a 
resource.”). 
 149 See, e.g., St. Petersburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cuccinello, 44 So. 2d 670, 676 (Fla. 1950); see also 
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 362 (3d ed. 2002) (“Entering a 
store during business hours would not be deemed a trespass because entry onto the property is based on 
implied consent.”). There is also the possibility of an implied IP license. See Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the 
Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. 
REV. 423, 514 (1999). 
 150 See MERGES, supra note 2, at 286–87 (“The choice to waive property rights is part and parcel of the 
property system, and owners often exercise this choice so as to reduce the worst potential effects of property 
rights.”); SINGER, supra note 149, at 362 (“Possessors of real property constantly grant non-owners permission 
to enter their property.”). 
 151 See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 
85 (2010) (noting that “licenses are ubiquitous in everyday life”). 
 152 See JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND § 11:1 
(2013) (defining a license as “the permission to do something on the land of another that, without such 
authority, would be unlawful”). 
 153 See MERGES, supra note 2, at 286 (citing Pharmaceuticals: Quagmire to Goldmine?, ECONOMIST, 
May 17, 2008, at 102) (“Most major pharmaceutical companies have undertaken voluntary free drug 
distribution programs.”). 
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advantages of inclusion, Merges contends that “the ability to waive property 
rights is a crucial benefit.”154 
The problem with waiver, even if inclusion is socially beneficial, is that it 
provides little certainty to nonowners. Compared to nonenforcement, waiver 
lowers the risk to a nonowner; without revoking a waiver, the owner cannot 
claim a nonowner is trespassing or infringing. However, like nonenforcement, 
a waiver or gratuitous license is freely revocable.155 If an owner withdraws a 
waiver or license, the nonowner may have no legal remedy, unless the license 
is coupled with a grant or constitutes an easement by estoppel.156 The 
ambulatory nature of the interest means that, in the absence of social norms or 
repeat play, a nonowner may have little incentive to rely on a waiver. 
Thus, except in limited circumstances, waiver does little to reduce the 
possibility of opportunism. Nonowners may attempt to increase the scope of 
their rights, to utilize the property excessively, or to maintain the property 
inadequately. These problems may discourage owners from granting a waiver 
or license. Similarly, nonowners may hesitate to participate in informal 
inclusion, given that a waiver or license is freely revocable and an owner can 
revoke, or threaten to revoke, the waiver at any time. To deter opportunism, it 
may be necessary to rely on more formal mechanisms of inclusion like 
contracts. 
B. Contractual Inclusion 
While informal inclusion typically relies on the discretion of owners and 
social norms, formal inclusion relies on legal rules. Specifically, two or more 
parties may enter into a contract in which an owner includes another in the use, 
possession, or enjoyment of property in exchange for some consideration. For 
example, an owner may include a nonowner by contractually agreeing not to 
enforce an exclusion right, from distressed loan workouts and foreclosure 
defenses,157 to the settlement of patent and copyright disputes.158 Similarly, 
 
 154 Id.  
 155 See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses § 122 (2004) (“A license ordinarily may be revoked 
without notice and without cause . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 156 Generally, a gratuitous license is irrevocable only in two circumstances: (i) if a licensor combines the 
license with a grant or (ii) if the license constitutes an easement by estoppel because the licensee reasonably 
and substantially relies on the license and revoking the license would be unjust. See id. 
 157 See Richard S. Fries, Bingham McCutchen LLP, Distressed Loan Workouts and Remedies, 
Presentation at the Practising Law Institute Seminar: Negotiating Real Estate Deals 2012 (June 5, 2012) 
(discussing agreements to waive or not to enforce rights). 
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there are many types of contracts, including IP licenses, in which an owner 
includes another by waiving the right to exclude in advance.159 
Unlike gratuitous licenses, which entail sharing, contractual licenses 
involve exchange. A ticket that permits a spectator to enter a sports stadium or 
movie theater is, by most accounts, a license.160 In exchange for entry into the 
stadium or theater, a licensee pays the admission price⎯i.e., the cost of the 
ticket. Similarly, an owner may license a patent in exchange for royalty 
payments or an equity stake in a firm.161 Licensing IP rights also serves as a 
mechanism for financing, risk-spreading, and specialization.162 
However, unlike gratuitous licenses, which are freely revocable, the 
meaning of “revocability” in contractual licenses is ambiguous.163 There is 
uncertainty about whether such agreements entail a contract, a license, or a 
contract and a license.164 The modern view is that nongratuitous licenses have 
most, perhaps all, of the attributes of contracts.165 Yet, arguably, even modern 
licenses, including IP licenses, are not identical to contracts. In analyzing 
copyright, Christopher Newman contends “the concept of license . . . belongs 
fundamentally to property, not contract.”166 Likewise, Merrill and Smith 
suggest that it may be worthwhile to distinguish between a “license” and a 
“contract for a license” because “it probably leads to confusion to start treating 
licenses as if they were themselves contracts.”167 Finally, IP licenses may 
 
 158 See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 392 (2003) (“The 
lion’s share of patent disputes are settled rather than litigated to a resolution in court.”).  
 159 See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (2004) (noting 
the “ubiquitous use of restrictive licensing agreements” in IP). 
 160 See BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 152, § 11:1 n.55 (collecting cases). 
 161 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2154 
(2012) (“[M]ost IP licensing agreements . . . measure royalties by the number of times an IP-protected good or 
process is used or the number of units that are created.”); Ash Nagdev et al., IP as Venture Capital: A Case 
Study of Microsoft IP Ventures, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 197, 208–09 (2008) (“Microsoft IP 
Ventures seeks to capitalize on this opportunity by licensing its IP in exchange for an equity stake in a 
potentially high growth start-up company.”).  
 162 See Nagdev et al., supra note 161, at 209. 
 163 While a contractual license is “revocable” in one sense, revocation may constitute a breach of contract, 
resulting in a claim for damages. See BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 152, § 11:6.  
 164 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 151, at 86. 
 165 See, e.g., McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Whether express or 
implied, a license is a contract ‘governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.’” (quoting Power Lift, 
Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1989))). 
 166 Christopher M. Newman, A License Is Not a “Contract Not to Sue”: Disentangling Property and 
Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1101, 1109 (2013).  
 167 THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, TEACHER’S MANUAL TO PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 157 (2d ed. 2012). 
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entail anti-opportunism devices that contracts do not, including the use of 
mandatory rules and the application of doctrines like misuse.168 
Compared to informal inclusion, contracts provide several benefits. 
Contracts allow parties to include others with more certainty. Because both 
parties know they can rely on legally enforceable remedies to vindicate their 
rights, they have less concern about opportunism and conflicts over use. 
Moreover, unlike informal inclusion, which is freely revocable, contractual 
inclusion provides more certainty to nonowners. Thus, an owner’s promise not 
to enforce the right to exclude may encourage socially beneficial reliance.169 In 
addition, because an owner will have less incentive to exclude, contracts may 
deter various types of strategic behavior—one of the primary objectives of 
contract law.170 
However, contracts are not without limitations. As an initial matter, 
contracts are costly to negotiate, draft, and enforce.171 Given such costs, 
informal inclusion can be superior to contractual inclusion in a number of 
circumstances. 
First, if the benefits of inclusion are relatively small, a contract may not be 
worth the costs.172 For example, if a child needs to enter a neighbor’s yard to 
retrieve a ball, the costs of a contract would exceed the benefits. Likewise, an 
invitation, rather than a formal contract, usually suffices for a dinner party. In 
both situations, there is little or no risk of opportunism. 
Second, even if opportunism is possible, relying on nonlegal sanctions such 
as social norms may be superior to drafting and enforcing a contract if the only 
risk is “low-value opportunism.” In analyzing the choice between law and 
norms in property disputes, Ellickson explains why the “the size of the stakes 
matters.”173 If the stakes are high, channeling parties into contracts and formal 
remedies may be preferable because “the exercise of informal remedies [may] 
 
 168 See Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 511 (2011). 
 169 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 
89 YALE L. J. 1261, 1276–83 (1980); Shavell, supra note 79, at 419; cf. Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous 
Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 416 & n.11 (1977).  
 170 See POSNER, supra note 83, at 117. 
 171 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 246–48 (1991) 
(discussing contracts as social controls and indicating that one “major drawback” of contracts is “the 
transaction costs of arranging and enforcing them”). 
 172 See id.  
 173 Id. at 257. 
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trigger a violent feud.”174 By contrast, if the stakes are low, “a grievant is less 
likely to regard the relatively high administrative costs of the legal system to 
be worthwhile.”175 Similarly, in analyzing the role of the law in facilitating 
cooperation, Eric Posner points out that “nonlegal sanctions deter low-value 
opportunism” whereas “contract law serves to deter certain kinds of high-value 
opportunism.”176 
Third, even with high-value opportunism, informal division can be superior 
to contractual division if reputation is sufficiently important or social norms 
are sufficiently robust.177 For example, the diamond trade in New York City 
involves valuable merchandise and a high risk of misappropriation.178 
Nevertheless, as Lisa Bernstein explains, “the industry is able to use 
reputation/social bonds at a cost low enough to create a system of private law 
enabling most transactions to be consummated and most contracts enforced 
completely outside the legal system.”179 
Overall, owners will have an incentive to include others by contract, rather 
than via nonenforcement or waiver, if the net benefits of contractual inclusion 
are positive and exceed the net benefits of informal inclusion. If the benefits of 
inclusion are relatively small, then drafting a contract is often not worth the 
costs. Even if the benefits of inclusion are significant, parties may not enter a 
contract if transaction costs are substantial (the attorneys’ fees may quickly 
exceed the gains from trade). Parties are likely to include others through 
contract if transaction costs are not prohibitive, if there is a danger of high-
value opportunism, and if reputation or social norms are inadequate to deter 
strategic behavior. 
However, even if owners have the ability to include both informally and 
contractually, their private incentive to include others may diverge from the 
socially optimal level of inclusion. There may be too little inclusion because 
contracts deter opportunism and prevent conflicts only imperfectly. For 
example, because contracts rely primarily on compensatory damages (while 
 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Posner, supra note 1, at 762; cf. Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social 
Norms Theory of Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 210, 212–13 (2009) (arguing that litigation in 
complex contracts is limited to extreme cases of opportunism).  
 177 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 134 (1992). 
 178 See id. at 120. 
 179 Id. at 138. 
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disfavoring specific performance and disallowing punitive damages), contracts 
may be inadequate to deter certain types of strategic behavior.180 Thus, the 
usual remedies for breach may be insufficient to deter opportunism, resulting 
in too little cooperation.181 
C. Proprietary Inclusion 
In addition to informal and contractual inclusion, the law authorizes parties 
to include others through various forms of property. Proprietary inclusion, like 
contractual inclusion, is typically more costly than informal inclusion. 
Although more expensive than informal inclusion, contractual inclusion and 
proprietary inclusion both provide more certainty and greater protection 
against the possibility of opportunism. However, if owners could achieve an 
optimal level of inclusion using contracts, then the forms of property would 
seem to be superfluous.  
As this Article explains below, these property forms continue to perform a 
useful function—they are instrumental in deterring opportunism and promoting 
cooperation—because parties cannot achieve the optimal level of inclusion 
through contract alone. Essentially, property forms complement contracts by 
providing owners with a set of standardized forms from which to choose in 
deciding how to include others. Moreover, these forms not only serve as viable 
alternatives to contract. In many situations, property forms also can provide 
more certainty and a greater degree of protection against opportunism. 
Accordingly, this Article analyzes four features of property that help to 
distinguish contractual and proprietary inclusion: (a) third-party effects, 
(b) mandatory rules, (c) fiduciary duties, and (d) supracompensatory remedies. 
There is, of course, a substantial literature on each of these features. This 
Article attempts to extend the existing analysis by focusing on how each 
attribute functions as an anti-opportunism device and how these attributes can 
serve as substitutes as well as complements. Ultimately, each feature serves as 
a justification for maintaining both contractual and proprietary inclusion.  
 
 180 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48 
ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 746 (2006); see also Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1205 (2010) (discussing shareholder opportunism and arguing that fraudulent 
transfer law “provides a powerful equitable remedy in a setting where contractual remedies often are 
inadequate to deter opportunism”). 
 181 Cf. Posner, supra note 1, at 762 (arguing that the “traditional model of contract law is inadequate” 
because rational individuals would act differently “if they could rely on the courts to deter opportunism in 
contractual relationships”). 
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1. Justifications 
a. Third-Party Effects 
Authorizing owners to include others through contracts or property forms is 
defensible only if there are meaningful differences between these two types of 
inclusion. Several scholars, including Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, Henry 
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, and Robert Merges, have pointed out 
important differences between contracts and property with respect to third 
parties. One difference between contracts and property is that contracts are in 
personam—binding the parties to the contract—whereas property rights are in 
rem—binding “the world.”182 Merrill and Smith argue that the reason these 
two modalities of rights exist is third-party information costs.183 Thus, 
allowing inclusion by both contract and property forms might be advantageous 
because, in different circumstances, each type of inclusion may reduce 
information costs with respect to third parties.184 
Like Merrill and Smith, Hansmann and Kraakman believe that there is a 
functional difference between contracts and property.185 However, they assert 
the difference is that “a property right in an asset, unlike a contract right, can 
be enforced against subsequent transferees of other rights in the asset.”186 In 
other words, “a property right ‘runs with the asset.’”187 Under this view, in 
which limitations on property types “facilitate verification of ownership of the 
rights offered for conveyance,” the law reduces verification costs “by 
presuming that all property rights in a given asset are held by a single 
 
 182 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 
780–89 (2001) (discussing the nature of in rem rights). 
 183 See id. at 790–99. 
 184 The argument for distinguishing contract and property based on third-party information costs rests on 
assuming that adequate notice does not solve the problem, an assumption that has been the subject of debate. 
Compare SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 32 n.7 (arguing that the information-cost problem can be resolved 
through adequate notice and registries), and Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 117, at S374 (arguing that 
limitations on property are not a matter of standardization but of notice), with Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 43–
45 (2000) (rejecting the idea that “notice cures all” because of “third-party information costs” on other market 
participants), and Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 89, at 148, 170 n.4 (contending that Hansmann and Kraakman 
“overlook the more pervasive role played by information costs that arise from nonstandard formats of 
information and that face more impersonal audiences such as potential violators of property rights”). 
 185 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 117, at S374. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
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owner.”188 This presumption of undivided ownership, according to Hansmann 
and Kraakman, is “subject to [an] exception that a partitioning of property 
rights across more than one owner is enforceable if there has been adequate 
notice of that partitioning to persons whom it might affect.”189 
To illustrate why property and contract might differ in terms of their effects 
on third parties, compare the functional implications of two types of property 
(easements and leases) with a type of contract (Creative Commons licenses).190 
Easements and leases both run with the land and thus bind future transferees.191 
By contrast, in Creative Commons licenses, license terms are not necessarily 
binding on downstream users because, as Merges points out, those users are 
not in privity of contract.192 As a result, the original contract between licensor 
and licensee does not capture the interests of all the users. For this reason, 
Merges advocates a statutory, rather than contractual, solution to this problem: 
Congress should legislate a “right to include” by incorporating a robust waiver 
mechanism into IP law.193 In doing so, Merges helpfully illustrates one 
limitation of contract in deterring opportunism and facilitating inclusion. 
b. Mandatory Rules 
While contracts rely primarily on default rules that the parties may modify, 
property forms often entail nonwaivable rules that restrict customizability, 
from disclosure requirements to the implied warranty of habitability. One 
function of these mandatory rules is to deter strategic bargaining, especially in 
situations in which parties may have asymmetric information.194 
 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 See Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 198 (2004) 
(“From a legal perspective, the Creative Commons is a copyright license. Thus the entire scheme operates by 
virtue of contract.”). 
 191 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 983. In most easements, “the benefit of the easement is 
attached to a particular parcel of land, and runs with the ownership of the benefitted land.” MERRILL & SMITH, 
supra note 151, at 200–01. Similarly, if a landlord transfers an apartment, the general rule is that the new 
landlord is “subject to the ongoing leasehold interest” and is bound by those provisions of the original lease 
that “‘run with the land.’” MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 712. 
 192 See Merges, supra note 190, at 198. 
 193 MERGES, supra note 2, at 229 (“The problem is that these [Creative Commons] licenses are only 
contracts. A better mechanism would be to build the waiver mechanism directly into copyright (and patent) 
law . . . .”); see also id. at 290 (advocating “a simple and binding mechanism for waiver—allowing a 
rightholder to make a binding dedication of his works to the public, and thus implementing a right to include 
that is coextensive with the traditional right to exclude at the heart of IP and property generally”). 
 194 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 826–27. 
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Many scholars note the role of mandatory rules in deterring opportunism. 
In discussing joint custody, Saul Levmore emphasizes that “mandatory rules 
reduce strategic behavior and attendant costs.”195 In analyzing the implied 
warranty of habitability, Merrill and Smith suggest that the implied warranty 
may be immutable because it “can plausibly be viewed as a form of protection 
strategy adopted in a context where tenants remain rationally ignorant and are 
vulnerable to strategic behavior by landlords.”196 In examining the corporation, 
Melvin Eisenberg asserts that the “law should also provide mandatory rules 
that empower the courts to override bargains concerning structural and 
distributional terms when necessary to prevent opportunism.”197 
Of course, mandatory rules also may prevent two parties from achieving a 
mutually beneficial exchange. Plus, there is a possibility that mandatory rules 
sometimes may increase opportunism.198 Thus, in any context, there is room to 
debate whether a nonwaivable rule is beneficial. But, theoretically, a rule that 
is mandatory may deter opportunism by preventing certain types of strategic 
bargaining. 
c. Fiduciary Duties 
As is well recognized, fiduciary duties are useful in reducing agency 
costs.199 Fiduciary law applies in many situations that entail a principal–agent 
relationship, including settlors and trustees and shareholders and managers.200 
If an agent’s incentives diverge from the principal’s objectives, the relationship 
entails agency costs.201 Agency costs include the costs associated with shirking 
as well as any costs that a principal may incur in attempting to monitor the 
agent to prevent shirking.202 
 
 195 Saul Levmore, Joint Custody and Strategic Behavior, 73 IND. L.J. 429, 433 (1998). 
 196 Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 833.  
 197 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1466 (1989). 
 198 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Contractual Perspective, 
18 J. CORP. L. 185, 197 (1993); cf. Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (2001) 
(“[U]sing mandatory rules to increase trust, in any form, may have precisely the opposite effect.”). 
 199 See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039, 1042 (2011). 
 200 See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and 
Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1991). 
 201 See Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1040, 1042; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 202 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 126, at 309; see also JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID 
MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES: THE PRINCIPAL–AGENT MODEL 215 (2002). 
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The purpose of fiduciary duties, including the duties of loyalty and care, is 
to reduce agency costs by providing an ex post check on opportunism.203 
Because the agent has fiduciary obligations to the principal, the agent may be 
liable if the agent violates one of the duties.204 Aware of this potential liability, 
the agent may have less incentive to act opportunistically.205 In discussing the 
role of fiduciary duties in corporate law, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel 
point out that the fiduciary principle “replaces prior supervision with 
deterrence” and that the “contours of the fiduciary principle reflect the 
difficulty that contracting parties have in anticipating when and how their 
interests may diverge.”206 Similarly, in exploring agency costs in trust law, 
Robert Sitkoff explains how “the fiduciary obligation has eclipsed limited 
powers as the chief device for controlling managerial agency costs.”207 
Moreover, the substance of fiduciary duties varies by context: fiduciary 
duties in corporate law are different from such duties in trust law.208 Therefore, 
in various contexts, fiduciary duties can play an important role in reducing 
agency costs and encouraging inclusion.209 Economists have long emphasized 
the role of different organizational forms in controlling agency costs.210 
d. Supracompensatory Remedies 
Property forms also differ from contracts in terms of their remedies. Unlike 
contracts, which typically rely on compensatory damages, many property 
forms entail supracompensatory remedies, including specific performance and 
 
 203 See Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1049 (“Agency theory, and in particular its emphasis on the problem of 
opportunism in circumstances of asymmetric information, explains these basic contours of fiduciary 
doctrine.”). 
 204 See id. at 1043. 
 205 See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1404 
(2002) (“[F]iduciary law can be justified on the grounds that it deters opportunistic behavior.”). 
 206 Frank H. Easterbook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 702 
(1982) (emphasis added). 
 207 Sitkoff, supra note 126, at 683. 
 208 See A. Joseph Warburton, Trusts Versus Corporations: An Empirical Analysis of Competing 
Organizational Forms, 36 J. CORP. L. 183, 186–87 (2010); see also Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1045 (“[T]he 
precise contours of the fiduciary obligation vary across the fiduciary fields.”). 
 209 Fiduciary duties are sometimes characterized as default rules, as the parties may customize the scope 
of the duties⎯e.g., exempting certain conflicted transactions from a duty of loyalty. See generally Tamar 
Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1211–12 (1995) (“In my opinion, most 
fiduciary rules constitute default rules.”). Typically, however, parties cannot eliminate the fiduciary 
obligations entirely. See Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1046 (discussing the “mandatory core” of fiduciary duties).  
 210 See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, supra note 116, at 323. 
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injunctions, punitive damages, and restitution.211 Often, these remedies can 
play a role in deterring opportunism as well.212 
First, consider specific performance and other forms of injunctive relief. 
For several reasons, including a concern about deterring efficient breach,213 
contract law generally disfavors the remedy of specific performance.214 By 
contrast, many property forms rely on specific performance more often.215 
There is some empirical evidence that requiring performance ex post may deter 
opportunism ex ante.216 More generally, one function of equity and equitable 
remedies, including injunctive relief, is to deter strategic behavior.217 
Second, consider punitive damages. In the American legal system, 
“[p]unitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract.”218 However, 
there is a possibility of punitive damages or treble damages for many forms of 
property, including easements,219 leases,220 and trusts.221 In many situations, 
 
 211 See PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 44, at 16; Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 381. 
 212 Cf. Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the Possible 
Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1970 n.27 (1996) (“[H]ard-to-detect opportunism 
must be subject to quite severe sanctions if it is to be effectively deterred.”). 
 213 See Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. ECON. 121, 146–47 
(1984) (arguing that specific performance “may be an undesirable remedy from the point of view of the 
creation of incentives to perform”); see also Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 
BELL J. ECON. 466, 466, 468 (1980) (emphasizing the desirability of moderate damages and the role of 
damages as substitute for complete contracts). 
 214 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
1, 20 (2001). 
 215 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 381. 
 216 See, e.g., Yair Listokin, The Empirical Case for Specific Performance: Evidence from the IBP–Tyson 
Litigation, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 469, 470 (2005); see also Subha Narasimhan, Modification: The Self-
Help Specific Performance Remedy, 97 YALE L.J. 61, 84 (1987) (“In contracts involving non-fungible goods 
or services, the only way to deter promisor opportunism is to strictly enforce the specific performance 
remedy.”). 
 217 See Smith, supra note 118 (manuscript at 3) (arguing that “equity in private law . . . is a coherent 
package of features motivated largely by one overriding goal: preventing opportunism”). 
 218 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981). 
 219 See, e.g., Apel v. Katz, 697 N.E.2d 600, 601, 608–09 (Ohio 1998). 
 220 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 15F (2013) (providing for treble damages “[i]f a tenant is 
removed from the premises or excluded therefrom by the landlord or his agent except pursuant to a valid court 
order”); Polk v. Sexton, 613 So. 2d 841, 845 (Miss. 1993) (upholding a punitive damages award for the breach 
of a commercial lease). 
 221 See, e.g., Miner v. Int’l Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 601 F. Supp. 1390, 1393 (D. 
Colo. 1985) (citing Rivero v. Thomas, 194 P.2d 533 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948)) (“Exemplary damages are 
available in the common law of trusts not to secure performance but to deter conduct harmful to the trusts.”). 
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the rationale for these types of supracompensatory damages is a concern about 
opportunism or bad faith,222 including an ability to avoid detection.223 
Third, consider the remedy of restitution.224 In contract law, a court usually 
calculates damages based on a party’s expectation interests, with reliance and 
restitution being described as “alternative” measures.225 Yet, as Andrew Kull 
explains, restitution can protect against certain types of opportunistic behavior 
in contractual enforcement.226 Recently, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
& Unjust Enrichment, for which Kull served as the reporter, extended the 
remedy of disgorgement of profits to opportunistic breaches.227 By contrast, 
unlike its relatively limited role in contract (at least historically), restitution has 
played, and continues to play, a significant role in several property forms, 
including trust and fiduciary law.228 
2. Applications 
As noted above, proprietary inclusion entails a number of forms. Each of 
these forms relies on a unique mixture of anti-opportunism devices, including 
mandatory rules, fiduciary duties, and supracompensatory remedies. In this 
section, I examine several well-recognized property forms, including 
(a) easements, (b) leases, (c) bailments, (d) condos and co-ops, and (e) trusts; 
 
 222 See David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990). 
 223 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 869, 874 (1998) (“[P]unitive damages ordinarily should be awarded if . . . an injurer has a chance of 
escaping liability . . . .” (italics removed)).  
 224 On restitution, see generally HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (2004); Mark P. 
Gergen, What Renders Enrichment Unjust?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1927 (2001); Andrew Kull, Rationalizing 
Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191 (1995); and Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 
(1985). 
 225 See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 
1148–49 (1970); see also Samuel Williston, Repudiation of Contracts, 14 HARV. L. REV. 317, 318 (1901) 
(discussing the “right to restitution as an alternative remedy instead of compensation in damages”). 
 226 See Andrew Kull, Restitution As a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1517 
(1994) (noting that rescission affords “protection against those forms of opportunism that exploit 
undercompensatory enforcement”). 
 227 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (2011); see also Caprice L. 
Roberts, The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1027, 1046 (2011) 
(describing “the disgorgement of profits remedy for opportunistic breach of contract”). 
 228 See Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1049 (noting that the “availability of a disgorgement 
remedy . . . reflects the additional deterrent and disclosure purposes of fiduciary law”); Smith, supra note 205, 
at 1496 (noting that the “deterrent effect of restitution mitigates the temptation for a fiduciary to act 
opportunistically”). 
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compare these forms both to each other and to other types of inclusion; and 
explore how each form deters opportunism. 
a. Easements 
In the United States, “[v]ast numbers of easements encumber land title 
records.”229 An easement is a “nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the 
possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses 
authorized by the easement.”230 Because owners may grant easements 
“gratuitously or as part of a more general exchange of property rights,”231 
easements can facilitate sharing or exchange. 
Easements differ from other types of inclusion that enable sharing. 
Compared to nonenforcement or waiver, easements offer greater certainty and 
permanence.232 An owner that includes others via nonenforcement or waiver 
can still decide to exclude at any time.233 By contrast, the owner of land that is 
subject to an easement cannot exclude the owner of an estate that has an 
easement to use the land.234 
Distinguishing easements and licenses is difficult.235 The difficulty is that 
both forms divide property according to a particular use, not possession. The 
“fundamental difference” between easements and revocable licenses is that, 
with revocable licenses, owners may “revoke consent at any time and thereby 
terminate the license[s],” while “easements are irrevocable interests in land of 
potentially perpetual duration.”236 Thus, compared to revocable licenses, 
easements provide more certainty. But the challenge is in distinguishing 
easements from irrevocable licenses.237 Courts usually characterize easements 
 
 229 Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1369 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 230 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2(1) (2000). 
 231 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 151, at 202. 
 232 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.1 (2000) (stating that easements are 
terminable by agreement between the landowner and the benefited party), with RESTATEMENT OF PROP. 
§ 519(1) & cmt. a (1944) (stating that licenses are terminable by the landowner’s will). 
 233 See RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 519(1) & cmt. a (1944). 
 234 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2(1) (2000) (“An easement . . . obligates the 
possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement.”). 
 235 See, e.g., Closson Lumber Co. v. Wiseman, 507 N.E.2d 974, 976 (Ind. 1987); see also Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases, 27 YALE L.J. 66, 66 (1917) (noting “[t]he 
unusual chaos of conceptions and inadequacy of reasoning in easement and license cases”).  
 236 BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 152, § 1.4. 
 237 See 3 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN & PATRICK A. RANDOLPH, JR., FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 37.1.2 (Patrick A. 
Randolph ed., 5th rev. ed. 2013) (“[T]he distinction between a license, particularly an irrevocable license, and 
an easement, is endlessly elusive . . . .”).  
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as “real property” as opposed to “mere licenses.”238 Yet the authority for the in 
rem nature of easements is “relatively thin.”239 Moreover, contractual licenses 
are arguably more like property than many courts have assumed.240 
Easements also differ from several types of inclusion that enable exchange. 
Unlike leases, easements are “nonpossessory” because they authorize only 
“limited uses” on the burdened property.241 Because they involve limited uses, 
the financing and risk-sharing functions that are pertinent for leases are not 
relevant for easements. Instead, easements serve a role similar to agreements 
between parties (often, neighbors) regarding the use of property. The modern 
trend is to view most easements as contracts,242 but easements retain several 
noncontractarian features. For example, unlike contracts, easements allow the 
original parties to bind future owners; that is, both the benefit and burden of an 
easement typically run with the land.243 
Easement law also has developed doctrines to combat opportunism, from 
disfavoring the variation of easements to issuing injunctions for abuse. Courts 
are reluctant to vary a party’s obligations under an easement.244 Antony Dnes 
and Dean Lueck suggest that the rationale for this reluctance is that “variation 
could be claimed opportunistically as a means of altering the easement, 
possibly resulting in costly adjudication.”245 In addition, an easement holder 
may “abuse” an easement by exceeding the scope of the easement.246 While 
Lee Strang advocates damages, rather than injunctions, as the proper remedy 
 
 238 See, e.g., Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. Jackson Co., 2010 WI 95, ¶ 15, 328 Wis. 2d 613, 785 
N.W.2d 615; Simmons v. Abbondandolo, 585 N.Y.S.2d 535, 536 (App. Div. 1992). 
 239 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 151, at 202. 
 240 See Newman, supra note 166, at 1103, 1109; see also supra notes 164–68 and accompanying text. 
 241 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2 cmt. d (2000); cf. Wagner v. Doehring, 553 
A.2d 684, 687 (Md. 1989) (“The nonpossessory character of an easement distinguishes the interest from 
possessory interests . . . .”). 
 242 See Abington Ltd. P’ship v. Heublein, 717 A.2d 1232, 1240 (Conn. 1998) (“[T]he recently approved 
provisions of the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Property (Servitudes) . . . . adopt a contracts oriented view 
of the law of easements and servitudes.”); cf. Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: 
Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1305 (1982) (stating that “[c]urrent easement law 
needs little modification” to recognize a servitude as an interest in land that can be created by contract). 
 243 See Carol M. Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments on Professors French and 
Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1982); see also supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 244 See Antony Dnes & Dean Lueck, Asymmetric Information and the Law of Servitudes Governing Land, 
38 J. LEGAL STUD. 89, 109–10 (2009). 
 245 Id. at 105 tbl.1. 
 246 See BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 152, § 8:17; see also supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text. 
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for this type of abuse,247 the traditional remedy of injunctive relief248 may help 
to reduce the likelihood of strategic behavior. 
b. Leases 
Leasing is one of the most common ways by which owners include others 
in their property.249 In 2010, out of nearly 112 million occupied housing units 
in the United States, over 37 million units were rentals.250 Many businesses, 
including most law firms, lease commercial real estate.251 And almost half of 
the nearly 3 million owners of farms rent their farmland to others.252 Leasing is 
also a common way of acquiring personal property such as airplanes and 
automobiles,253 as well as commercial and industrial equipment.254 
Leases facilitate exchange without requiring the outright transfer of 
property.255 A lessor transfers possession of the apartment, office space, farm, 
or car to a lessee. In return, the lessee makes a (rental) payment to the lessor. 
As discussed above, leases also have served as a financing device from 
preindustrial times to the present.256 They help to spread risk by providing 
tenants with more flexibility than ownership would provide.257 And leases 
entail specialization: a landlord and tenant both benefit by performing different 
functions in managing and using a complex asset.258 
However, leases differ from other forms of inclusion, including licenses 
and easements. While a license concerns use, a lease concerns possession, 
 
 247 See Strang, supra note 122, at 937. 
 248 See id. (“[C]ourts will, under the American rule, enjoin misuse of an easement.”). 
 249 See Ellickson, supra note 16, at 1372 (“The scores of millions of leaseholds in the United States 
demonstrate the ubiquity of these opportunities for mutual gain.”); Thomas J. Miceli et al., The Property–
Contract Boundary: An Economic Analysis of Leases, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 165, 165 (2001) 
(“[L]easing . . . is a common economic arrangement.”). 
 250 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 615 tbl.982 (2011), 
available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0982.pdf.  
 251 See Ed Poll, Farewell, Firm Overhead, LEGAL MGMT., Apr./May 2012, at 58, 60. 
 252 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SB/93-10, WHO OWNS AMERICA’S 
FARMLAND? (1993), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/1/statbrief/sb93_10.pdf.  
 253 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 650. 
 254 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 250, at 756 tbl.1227. 
 255 See Miceli et al., supra note 249, at 183 (“In many economic settings, leasing an asset is preferred to 
owning it.”). 
 256 See supra Part II.A.3. 
 257 See supra Part II.A.4. 
 258 See supra Part II.A.5. 
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which allows a nonowner to engage in multiple uses of the property.259 In 
addition, compared to the rules governing licenses, lease law entails more 
mandatory rules, including the implied warranty of habitability in residential 
leases.260 
Distinguishing leases and easements is straightforward, in theory.261 The 
distinction turns on whether an interest is for “exclusive possession,” in which 
case it is a lease, or a “nonpossessory right to use,” in which case it is an 
easement.262 But, if the terms of a lease narrow a possessory interest and the 
terms of an easement involve relatively broad use rights, the distinction begins 
to disappear.263 
Finally, since the landlord–tenant revolution,264 many courts assume leases 
are contracts.265 However, although residential leases are similar to contracts, 
including in their remedies for breach, leases differ in several ways. First, once 
in possession, a tenant, unlike a party to a contract, has an in rem right against 
the world.266 Second, at least for residential leases, lease law relies on 
mandatory rules, such as the implied warranty of habitability, more often than 
contract law.267 Third, like the benefit and burden of an easement, the terms of 
a lease often run with the land.268 This feature of property can produce 
outcomes, like the inability of a new landlord to evict an existing tenant, that 
differ from the result if leases were simply contracts.269 
Many of the rules governing leases target opportunism. Historically, 
agricultural leases provided a way to minimize the risk of a landlord’s 
expropriating the land and inputs.270 By contrast, modern residential leases 
 
 259 See FRIEDMAN & RANDOLPH, supra note 237, § 37.1.1. 
 260 See 1 id. § 10:1.2 (noting that the “implied warranty of habitability . . . . confronts all residential 
landlords”). 
 261 BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 152, § 1:20. 
 262 Id. 
 263 See FRIEDMAN & RANDOLPH, supra note 237, § 37.1.2. 
 264 See Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord–Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 
503 (1982) (“It is generally acknowledged that the 1960’s and 1970’s saw a revolution of sorts in American 
landlord–tenant law.”); Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord–Tenant Law: Causes and 
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 517 (1984). 
 265 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 266 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 822. 
 267 See id. at 826–28. 
 268 Id. at 827–28. 
 269 See id. 
 270 See Miceli et al., supra note 249, at 177 (“[T]he conveyance gives the tenant a greater incentive to 
invest by protecting him from the risk of appropriation . . . .”). 
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involve active management, maintenance, and governance problems in which 
landlords can exploit asymmetric information.271 As a result, the law attempts 
to deter landlord opportunism by providing each tenant with an implied 
warranty of habitability.272 There is a considerable literature on whether this 
warranty should be a mandatory or default rule.273 However, if the purpose of 
the rule is to deter landlord opportunism, there is a case for the rule being 
nonwaivable. A mandatory rule may protect tenants who lack the financial 
resources to hire an attorney to review the lease or a professional to inspect the 
property.274 Because of asymmetric information, such tenants may be 
particularly “vulnerable to strategic behavior.”275 
Understanding the lease as an anti-opportunism device helps to explain 
divergences among the different types of leases. Unlike residential leases, most 
commercial leases are not subject to a warranty of fitness for intended 
purpose.276 Moreover, while most states impose a duty to mitigate damages on 
a landlord if a tenant vacates a dwelling,277 there is in most states no analogous 
duty to mitigate if a tenant vacates a commercial property.278 These differences 
may be justifiable if the risk of opportunism is lower in the context of 
commercial leases. In general, commercial tenants may have more 
sophistication, greater legal representation, and higher financial stakes than 
residential tenants.279 Courts recognize an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing in commercial leases, and this covenant may serve as a check on 
 
 271 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 651; Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 827. 
 272 See Lueck & Miceli, supra note 14, at 218–19 (describing how the law “provide[s] tenants with an 
enforcement mechanism by transforming the lease into a contract with an implied warranty of habitability”). 
 273 See, e.g., David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. 
REV. 389, 424–25 (2011) (examining the negative effects of a default rule on tenants and collecting citations). 
 274 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 827. 
 275 Id. at 833; see also supra Part III.C.1.b (discussing mandatory rules). 
 276 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 695 (citing Barton Enters. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996)) 
(“To date, only a small minority of states have adopted an implied warranty of fitness in commercial cases.”). 
For a survey, see Anthony J. Vlatas, Note, An Economic Analysis of Implied Warranties of Fitness in 
Commercial Leases, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 658, 659 n.5 (1994). 
 277 See, e.g., Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc., v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 296–97 (Tex. 
1997) (adopting a duty to mitigate and noting that forty-two states and D.C. have adopted this duty in 
residential leases); see also Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767, 770–71 (N.J. 1977). 
 278 See Lueck & Miceli, supra note 14, at 220 n.95 (“[T]he duty to mitigate has not been universally 
applied to commercial leases.”). 
 279 See Daniel B. Bogart, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Leasing: The Right Doctrine in the 
Wrong Transaction, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 275, 277–78, 300–01 (2008) (discussing ways in which 
commercial leases differ from residential leases). 
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opportunism.280 But, overall, the risk of opportunism based on informational 
asymmetries is arguably lower in the commercial context. 
Conversely, tenants may impose costs on landlords by excessively utilizing 
or inadequately maintaining rental property.281 The common law addressed this 
concern through the doctrine of waste,282 which still applies, although now 
landlords usually specify what tenants may or may not do in the terms of a 
lease.283 As Lueck and Miceli suggest, the implied warranty of habitability and 
the doctrine of waste may “work in combination to create efficient bilateral 
incentives for maintenance in the presence of the rental externality.”284 
c. Bailments 
The bailment “continues to be a pervasive transaction in modern life.”285 A 
bailment is a legal form in which an owner transfers possession of personal 
property to a nonowner who maintains temporary custody of the property for a 
limited purpose.286 A bailment can serve many functions, including sharing, 
exchange, and specialization. A gratuitous bailment entails the sharing of 
property by a bailor or the free provision of custodial services by the bailee.287 
By contrast, a bailment for hire, in which the bailor and bailee both benefit,288 
facilitates exchange. Bailments also involve specialization. For example, dry 
cleaners and jewelers perform specialized services, and valet parking and coat 
checks are specialized ways of parking cars and hanging coats. 
 
 280 See id. at 280. 
 281 See John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (2007); 
Vlatas, supra note 276, at 690–91. 
 282 See Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist Interpretation, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 653, 675–77 (2006); Stake, supra note 69, at 38. 
 283 See Lovett, supra note 281, at 1219–20 (“[P]arties frequently negate common law or statutory default 
rules on waste by adopting their own contractual terms.”). 
 284 Lueck & Miceli, supra note 14, at 219. 
 285 R.H. Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive Uniform Standard of 
Reasonable Care, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 97, 100 (1992). 
 286 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 464 (“[E]xamples of bailments include the transfer of clothing 
to a dry cleaning shop for cleaning, the transfer of securities to a broker for safekeeping, or the transfer of an 
automobile to a valet for parking.”). 
 287 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 812 n.118 (“Gratuitous bailments are those voluntary 
bailments in which the bailee receives no explicit or implicit consideration, current or prospective.”). 
 288 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS § 23, at 27 (James Schouler ed., 9th 
ed. 1878) (setting out a tripartite framework for a bailee’s duty of care based on whether the bailment is for the 
sole benefit of bailee, the sole benefit of bailor, or beneficial for both). 
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Bailments differ from both licenses and leases. While bailees typically 
enjoy the right to exclude third parties, licensees generally do not.289 In 
addition, while bailees usually obtain possession of bailed property for a 
specific purpose,290 tenants may use leased property for any lawful purpose not 
prohibited in the lease.291 Moreover, unlike leases, bailments only apply to 
personal property, and often (but not always) involve smaller stakes.292 
While bailment law has a “strong contractual element,”293 bailments and 
contracts are distinct.294 First, once a bailor transfers possession to the bailee, 
the bailee steps into the bailor’s shoes and has a right to exclude third parties 
from the property.295 Second, after transferring property to a bailee, the bailor 
retains most of the rights associated with ownership, including the right to 
exclude, transfer, or devise.296 Third, unlike contracts, bailments entail several 
mandatory rules that impose strict liability.297 A bailee might convert goods for 
personal use, deviate from the bailment’s terms and use the property for other 
purposes, or misdeliver goods by returning them to a wrong party.298 Yet, in 
each situation—conversion, contractual deviation, and misdelivery of goods—
the law imposes an immutable rule of strict liability.299 
Imposing strict liability via these mandatory rules may deter opportunism. 
For example, mandatory strict liability for conversion may be desirable 
because the bailee is violating a bailor’s rights by using the property for the 
bailee’s own purposes.300 Permitting the parties to opt out of this rule might 
open the door for opportunism, and the benefits of allowing a nonnegligent use 
 
 289 See BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 152, § 11:5; MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 464. 
 290 Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 812. 
 291 See id. at 822. 
 292 See id. at 811. 
 293 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 464. 
 294 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 811–20 (investigating in personam, intermediate, and in rem 
relations in bailment law); see also William V. Vetter, The Parking Lot Cases Revisited: Confusion at or 
About the Gate, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 27, 31 (1999) (“Bailment rules, as applied, seem more consistent 
with property, agency, or trust law than with contract law.”). For an earlier statement suggesting that, in 
practice, bailments and contracts diverge, see William King Laidlaw, Principles of Bailment, 16 CORNELL 
L.Q. 286, 287 (1931) (“Although it is frequently said that bailment is founded upon contract, the actual 
decisions show that it is not so founded.”).  
 295 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 464. 
 296 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 812. 
 297 See id. at 816–19. 
 298 See id.  
 299 See id.  
 300 Id. at 817–18. 
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of the bailor’s property are negligible.301 Moreover, strict liability for 
contractual deviation may deter bailees from presenting themselves as the 
ostensible owners of the property.302 Again, there seems to be little cost in 
discouraging this type of strategic behavior. Finally, opportunism may help to 
explain a puzzle about misdelivery: namely, why the law employs a negligence 
standard for bailed property that is lost, stolen, or destroyed but strict liability 
for goods that a bailee misdelivers.303 Strict liability for misdelivery may deter 
certain types of opportunism in which the bailee could collude with a third 
party.304 By contrast, deterring opportunism may be less of a concern for goods 
that are lost, stolen, or destroyed if the bailee cannot benefit.305 Thus, strict 
liability for misdelivery, as well as conversion and contractual deviation, may 
serve an anti-opportunism function. 
d. Condos and Co-ops 
The use of common-interest communities (CICs), including condominiums 
(condos) and cooperatives (co-ops), has grown exponentially.306 With condos 
and co-ops, residents purchase individual units and pay an association fee to 
maintain common areas and amenities.307 By purchasing individual units, 
residents obtain some of the benefits of homeownership, e.g., residents may 
prefer living in CICs to leasing apartments if they value having control over 
decisions like remodeling the kitchen.308 At the same time, CICs also achieve 
 
 301 See id. at 819. 
 302 Id. at 818. 
 303 See, e.g., Helmholz, supra note 285, at 99 (concluding that “[i]t is hard to see any good reason” for this 
distinction). 
 304 Merrill and Smith hint at this type of collusion by noting that “misdelivery confers a benefit on a third 
party” and, as a result, “the bailee may be tempted to connive with a third party to ‘misdeliver’ the property, 
and it will be difficult for the bailor to prove that this has happened.” MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 151, at 
480 (quoting Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 815) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 305 A bailee’s conniving with a third party to “steal” goods is less likely because, unlike a bona fide 
purchaser who can acquire title if he receives misdelivered goods from a bailee in the ordinary course of 
business, a third party could not acquire title for goods that are “stolen” because the third party would not be a 
buyer in the ordinary course of business. See U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (2012).  
 306 See Michael H. Schill et al., The Condominium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical Analysis of 
Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 278–80 (2007); see also Hansmann, supra note 109, at 25 
(discussing how condos and co-ops “have spread rapidly through the real estate market”).  
 307 See Hansmann, supra note 109, at 26. 
 308 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 750. 
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economies of scale regarding maintenance and certain amenities, like a pool or 
tennis courts, that residents may not otherwise have been able to afford.309 
Compared to leases, CICs mitigate the costs of inclusion. Because residents 
own their units, condos avoid excessive utilization or inadequate maintenance, 
except in common areas of the building.310 But, unlike leases, CICs introduce 
the risk of opportunism by an association or governing board.311 Moreover, as 
Lior Strahilevitz notes, some amenities can function as exclusionary devices, 
suggesting that CICs also may involve a danger of discrimination.312 
The main differences between condos and co-ops involve financing and 
approving residents. With respect to financing, condos may have a financing 
advantage because the collective mortgage in a co-op means that each owner 
“bears a portion of the risk that one of his or her fellow share owners will 
default.”313 However, the collective mortgage in a co-op does make it easier 
for co-ops to utilize tax-deductible debt for improvements, impose liens on 
defaulting owners, and evict owners for transgressing rules.314 In approving 
residents, co-ops may reduce demand by requiring the disclosure of financial 
records, imposing limitations on shareholder debt, and prohibiting 
subletting.315 On the other hand, these strict financing and approval 
requirements may reduce the risk for other shareholders.316 Plus, some owners 
may desire the type of exclusivity that certain co-ops provide, though attempts 
by co-ops “to maintain a community with certain desired characteristics” can 
increase the risk of discrimination.317 
 
 309 See Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 841–42; Mark D. West & 
Emily M. Morris, The Tragedy of the Condominiums: Legal Responses to Collective Action Problems After the 
Kobe Earthquake, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 903, 927 (2003). 
 310 See Hannah J. Wiseman, Rethinking the Renter/Owner Divide in Private Governance, 2012 UTAH L. 
REV. 2067, 2075 (arguing that, for both condo owners and apartment tenants, “a third party typically provides 
most building maintenance—thus creating different incentives for upkeep by unit tenants”). 
 311 See Yoram Barzel & Tim R. Sass, The Allocation of Resources by Voting, 105 Q.J. ECON. 745, 770 
(1990); see also West & Morris, supra note 309, at 927 (discussing how strategic behavior is a “source of 
collective-action costs” for condo owners). 
 312 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437, 
449 (2006) (exploring whether “residential golf communities have functioned as exclusionary club goods”). 
 313 Schill et al., supra note 306, at 283; see also Allen C. Goodman & John L. Goodman, Jr., The Co-op 
Discount, 14 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 223, 225 (1997). 
 314 See Schill et al., supra note 306, at 283. 
 315 Id. at 283–84. 
 316 See id. at 284. 
 317 Id.; cf. Strahilevitz, supra note 312, at 452 (discussing how residents in Manhattan cooperatives may 
want to exclude certain applicants). 
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The laws governing CICs entail rules aimed at mitigating opportunism. A 
key feature distinguishing condos from co-ownership is that the owners of 
condos generally do not possess the right of partition.318 This eliminates the 
risk of strategic exit.319 Jurisdictions differ on whether condo developers are 
subject to fiduciary duties,320 but condo directors are normally subject to such 
duties.321 In addition, in many jurisdictions, the covenants in the master deed, 
as well as subsequent actions by the association or board, are subject to a 
“reasonableness” requirement.322 Finally, other anti-opportunism doctrines, 
including the implied warranty of habitability, apply to co-ops (technically, co-
op shareholders are “lessees”),323 but generally do not apply to condos.324 
Should an anti-opportunism device like the implied warranty of habitability 
extend to CICs? Existing law appears to turn on a formalistic distinction: co-op 
shareholders, as lessees, enjoy an implied warranty; condo owners, who are not 
lessees, do not.325 But, functionally, the owners of co-ops and condos are 
similarly situated. Unlike residential tenants, the owners of co-ops and condos 
tend to have a significant financial stake in the property.326 Plus, a purchaser of 
a co-op or condo may be more likely than a residential tenant to obtain an 
inspection of the unit,327 especially if a lender requires it.328 Thus, there may be 
 
 318 See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 616 n.258 (2001). 
 319 See id. 
 320 See 31 C.J.S. Estates § 261 (2008 & Supp. 2013). 
 321 See, e.g., VINCENT DI LORENZO, NEW YORK CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE LAW § 12:2 (rev. 2d 
ed. Supp. 2013).  
 322 See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Cal. 1994) (citing CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1354 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 5975 (2014))). 
 323 See Christopher S. Brennan, Note, The Next Step in the Evolution of the Implied Warranty of 
Habitability: Applying the Warranty to Condominiums, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3042 (1999).  
 324 See id. at 3041.  
 325 See id. at 3041–42. 
 326 See Hansmann, supra note 109, at 26. 
 327 See, e.g., Alisa M. Levin, Condo Developers and Fiduciary Duties: An Unlikely Pairing?, 24 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 197, 204–05 (2011) (discussing how condominium form contracts typically provide an 
inspection period at or near the time of contracting, at or near the time of closing, or both). 
 328 Cf. Craig R. Thorstenson, Note, Mortgage Lender Liability to the Purchasers of New or Existing 
Homes, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 191, 202 (“Construction loans usually contain a provision allowing the mortgage 
lender to inspect the house as its construction progresses.”). But cf. Hansmann, supra note 109, at 38 (“No 
individual purchaser [of a condo or co-op] has an incentive to bear on his own the full cost of inspecting the 
common features of the building . . . . In contrast . . . the purchaser of a single-family house, receives the full 
benefit of an inspection and, therefore, has an appropriate incentive to undertake it.”); Debra Pogrund Stark & 
Andrew Cook, Pay It Forward: A Proactive Model to Resolving Construction Defects and Market Failure, 38 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 4 n.7 (2003) (“With a condominium purchase, the purchaser rarely inspects the common 
elements of the building, especially if there are a large number of units for the building. But, pursuant to state 
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less need for an implied warranty of habitability to prevent opportunism, and 
no reason for treating co-ops and condos differently in this regard. 
e. Trusts 
The three main types of trusts—donative, charitable, and business—each 
facilitate inclusion. Donative and charitable trusts promote sharing, as owners 
gratuitously transfer property to trustees for the benefit of ascertainable 
beneficiaries329 or charitable purposes.330 These trusts facilitate specialization 
as well because they rely on “managerial intermediation”: the beneficiaries 
receive distributions of income and principal from the trust, while a trustee 
specializes in managing, investing, and distributing trust property.331 
Business trusts facilitate exchange, rather than sharing, in pensions, 
investments (asset securitization, mutual funds, and real estate investment), 
and corporate and municipal bond transactions.332 Business trusts also serve 
the functions of financing, risk-spreading, and specialization. For example, the 
use of trusts as “special purpose vehicles” in asset securitization plays a key 
role in structured finance.333 Financial institutions utilize business trusts “to 
diversify lending risk,”334 and mutual funds rely on trusts to allow small 
investors to diversify their portfolios.335 Corporate and municipal bond 
transactions that embrace the trust form also benefit by having a trustee act as a 
“sophisticated financial intermediary.”336 
Trusts differ from other forms of inclusion in important ways. Inclusion by 
waiver, rather than through a donative or charitable trust, would eliminate the 
benefits of managerial intermediation.337 Moreover, while charitable trusts are 
 
condominium laws, there is typically a lengthy Property Report that is provided to the purchaser that should 
disclose the condition of the common elements.”). 
 329 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402 (2010). 
 330 See id. § 405(a).  
 331 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law as Fiduciary Governance Plus Asset Partitioning, in THE WORLDS 
OF THE TRUST 428, 429–30 (Lionel Smith ed., 2013); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing 
Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 9), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2327153; see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 113, at 543. 
 332 See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 
YALE L.J. 165, 167–74 (1997); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: 
Unraveling the Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 562 (2003). 
 333 Schwarcz, supra note 332, at 564–65. 
 334 Id. at 565. 
 335 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 113, at 556. 
 336 See Langbein, supra note 332, at 174. 
 337 See supra Part III.A. 
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a “close cousin” to nonprofit organizations,338 a trust is more focused in 
purpose and has more stringent fiduciary duties.339 Partnerships and 
corporations compete with business trusts but, as discussed below, these 
organizational forms differ in several respects, including their fiduciary duties. 
Finally, John Langbein and others have noted the close connection between 
trusts and contracts.340 Insofar as these forms differ, the differences seem 
explainable by alternative approaches to opportunism. For example, trust law 
entails a greater reliance on both asset partitioning341 and mandatory rules.342 
Because a trustee acts as an agent of both the settlor and the beneficiaries, a 
trust entails a high risk of opportunism. Robert Sitkoff emphasizes that the 
“problems of shirking and monitoring, the driving concerns of agency cost 
analysis, abound in trust administration.”343 The primary legal constraints on 
this type of “agency misbehavior,” which Jonathan Macey describes as “trustee 
opportunism,”344 are fiduciary duties.345 The duty of loyalty and duty of care 
can deter trustees from misappropriating or mismanaging trust property.346 A 
key feature of fiduciary duties is that they vary by context. For example, 
fiduciary duties are more stringent in trust law than corporate law.347 This 
tailoring of fiduciary obligations provides parties with multiple forms from 
which to choose when deciding whether to include others. 
The risk of opportunism is especially significant in charitable trusts. Unlike 
donative trusts, whose beneficiaries often are in a position to enforce the 
 
 338 Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 437 (1998). On nonprofits, see generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of 
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).  
 339 See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 
1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974).  
 340 See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 650–59, 671 
(1995); see also Sitkoff, supra note 126, at 629–31 (discussing the contractarian challenge). 
 341 See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 338, at 472 (discussing how trusts play an asset partitioning 
function that is impracticable to replicate via contract); Sitkoff, supra note 126, at 631–33. 
 342 See M.W. LAU, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRUSTS 30 (2011) (arguing that, because of the role of 
mandatory rules, “[t]rust law is not merely a specialized branch of contract law”). 
 343 Sitkoff, supra note 126, at 623. 
 344 Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295, 316 
(1988). 
 345 Id.; see also Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1049 (“[T]he problem of opportunism in circumstances of 
asymmetric information explains [the] basic contours of fiduciary doctrine.”). 
 346 See Macey, supra note 344, at 316; Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1049; see also supra notes 203–05 and 
accompanying text. 
 347 See Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1045 (discussing how the agency problem in family trusts differs from 
agency problem in publicly traded corporations); see also supra note 208 and accompanying text.  
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trustee’s fiduciary duties, charitable trusts rely on state attorneys general, who 
usually have limited resources, and little political will, to expend on 
enforcement.348 As a result, some law reform efforts have attempted to 
incorporate new enforcement mechanisms, including the expansion of standing 
for the settlor, in order to monitor the duties of a charitable trustee.349 
Business trusts also rely on fiduciary duties to prevent opportunism. 
Historically, fiduciary duties were a key element in adopting the trust form in 
ERISA and pension law.350 Even after ERISA, opportunism by an employer or 
employees is still possible.351 However, in comparing business trusts and 
corporations, Joseph Warburton finds that “trust law is effective in curtailing 
opportunistic behavior, as trust managers charge significantly lower fees than 
their observationally equivalent corporate counterparts.”352 Warburton’s study 
suggests that “trusts are more effective than corporations in curtailing 
opportunistic behavior by managers,” and that the fiduciary duties in trust law 
are “a superior mechanism for mitigating managerial opportunism and agency 
conflict within business organizations.”353 As discussed below, fiduciary duties 
in corporate law may have certain offsetting advantages. 
3. Extensions 
a. Partnerships and Corporations 
Rather than relying on business trusts, today’s business enterprises 
organize primarily as partnerships and corporations.354 Including others via a 
partnership (general, limited, limited liability, or limited liability limited) or 
corporation (publicly traded, closely held, or privately held) serves several 
functions, including financing, risk-spreading, and specialization. 
 
 348 See Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax 
Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 622–24 (1999); Joshua C. Tate, Should Charitable Trust Enforcement Rights Be 
Assignable?, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045, 1047 (2010); see also Sitkoff, supra note 331 (manuscript at 20). 
 349 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (2010); see also Tate, supra note 348, at 1051–56. 
 350 See Langbein, supra note 332, at 182. 
 351 See, e.g., Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive 
Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1158 (1988) (“Once the initial agreement is concluded, either party may 
have an incentive to behave opportunistically.”). 
 352 Warburton, supra note 208, at 183. 
 353 Id. at 187. 
 354 See Schwarcz, supra note 332, at 559–60. 
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Partnerships are an alternative to debt financing,355 and corporations serve 
as financing devices as well.356 In addition, partnerships and corporations both 
help to spread risk. Indeed, one explanation for the partnership form is the 
“insurance theory” of partnership.357 Likewise, in corporations, maintaining 
limited liability and different classes of stock can reduce the risk borne by 
shareholders.358 Finally, both forms entail specialization. In their seminal work 
on the corporation, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means discuss the advantages of 
separating ownership (by shareholders) from control (by managers).359 This 
type of separation allows the officers to serve as “specialized managers of a 
complex of assets,” while the shareholders, or partners, receive the “benefits of 
this asset management” through dividends or earnings.360 
Overall, partnerships and corporations provide more certainty than informal 
inclusion, greater protection than contracts, and more flexibility than business 
trusts. Specifically, informal inclusion is insufficient to provide the 
permanence necessary for a business of potentially infinite duration. Contracts 
may not be capable of replicating the functions of a corporation, including 
partitioning assets361 and preventing opportunistic holdup.362 Partnerships and 
corporations do serve as substitutes for business trusts.363 But these forms 
differ from trusts, in terms of their insolvency regimes and residual 
claimants.364 Plus, the flexibility of the corporate form may explain why most 
owners incorporate rather than create a trust for their business enterprises.365 
Partnerships and corporations both entail anti-opportunism devices. The 
risk of opportunism is pervasive in partnerships, close corporations, and public 
 
 355 See WILLIAM KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, Jr., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 53–54 (3d ed. 1988). 
 356 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
10–11 (1991) (“The corporation is a financing device and is not otherwise distinctive.”). 
 357 See Kevin Lang & Peter-John Gordon, Partnerships as Insurance Devices: Theory and Evidence, 26 
RAND J. ECON. 614, 614 (1995). 
 358 See POSNER, supra note 83, at 536–37; Schwarcz, supra note 332, at 574. 
 359 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 114, at 5–7.  
 360 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 805–06. 
 361 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 
387, 390 (2000). 
 362 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 120, at 47; Grossman & Hart, supra note 118, at 716–17.  
 363 See Henry Hansmann et al., The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective, 2005 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 5, 14. 
 364 See Langbein, supra note 332, at 189 (discussing insolvency regimes); Schwarcz, supra note 332, at 
585 (discussing residual claimants). 
 365 See Warburton, supra note 208, at 184 (“[T]he business flexibility that corporations grant leads to 
greater agency conflict and risk taking, but also to potentially superior risk-adjusted performance.”). 
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corporations.366 In partnerships and close corporations, “reputation and 
interpersonal trust can play a larger role in protecting against opportunism.”367 
Partners may apportion income to reduce strategic behavior.368 If shareholders 
of a close corporation threaten to exit strategically, the corporate form itself 
“provides a robust solution to the problem caused by threats of opportunistic 
exit.”369 In addition, in publicly traded firms, the potential for investors to 
“exit” by selling their shares may deter opportunism by managers as well as 
shareholders.370 Corporate law also entails mandatory rules, such as disclosure 
requirements and insider trading prohibitions,371 that may assist in deterring 
strategic behavior.372 
The ultimate safeguards against strategic behavior in partnership and 
corporate law, as in trust law, are fiduciary duties.373 Although trust law, with 
its more stringent fiduciary duties, may be superior to corporate law in 
deterring opportunism, Warburton finds there is a trade-off: corporations retain 
greater flexibility and achieve a higher rate of return for their investors.374 In 
any event, the risk of opportunism, as well as the range of anti-opportunism 
devices, is an important factor in selecting among such organizational forms.375 
 
 366 See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations, in CONCENTRATED 
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 177, 177 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000); Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the 
Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 238 (1992); Richard 
Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 605 (2011).  
 367 Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 796 n.18 (2007); 
see also Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and 
Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 927–29 (1999) (discussing nonlegal 
constraints on opportunism in close corporations). 
 368 See Bradley T. Borden, Partnership Tax Allocations and the Internalization of Tax-Item Transactions, 
59 S.C. L. REV. 297, 303–17 (2008).  
 369 Rock & Wachter, supra note 367, at 921.  
 370 See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 26 (2012).  
 371 See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 
882–86 (1983). But cf. Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog That Did Not 
Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167, 174–78 (2005) (noting the relative silence by “officers, directors, and controlling 
shareholders” toward the issue of insider trading). 
 372 On the use of mandatory rules in corporate law, see generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting 
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1820 (1989); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1395 (1989); and Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 
NW. U. L. REV. 542 (1990).  
 373 Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE 
OF BUSINESS 55, 77 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1991). 
 374 Warburton, supra note 208, at 184. 
 375 See O’Kelley, Jr., supra note 366, at 218–19 (explicating a “theory of form choice” in which parties 
“choose a governance structure for their firm that provides the optimal mix of adaptability and protection from 
opportunism”); cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190, 215 
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b. Franchises 
The franchise is a popular legal device for including others.376 The owner 
of a franchise (the franchisor) may franchise an outlet by including another 
(the franchisee), rather than expanding the firm, if doing so reduces agency 
costs.377 Specifically, a firm will create a franchise if the agency costs of 
franchising (inefficient risk-bearing, free riding, and appropriating quasi-rents) 
are lower than the agency costs of owning and operating a new outlet 
(managerial shirking).378 
While franchises are an alternative form of inclusion for attempting to 
reduce agency costs, there is a risk of opportunism by both franchisors and 
franchisees.379 For example, franchisees may fail to maintain a brand.380 They 
may “manipulate information” or shirk their obligations to provide customer 
service and to “maintain the cleanliness of [their] unit[s].”381 Such actions 
increase monitoring costs for owners and reduce the agency-cost advantage of 
franchises.382 Conversely, franchisors may act strategically by threatening to 
terminate an agreement to extract quasi-rents,383 although ex post rents may 
discourage ex ante opportunism.384 Franchisors also may encroach upon 
 
(2001) (“[F]irms select from among the menu of possible organizational forms for the very purpose of 
surmounting the difficulties otherwise imposed by contracting costs.”). 
 376 See G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 
503, 503 n.1 (1985) (“Franchising accounts for approximately one-third of total retail sales in the United States 
and Canada.”). 
 377 See id. at 503; Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 
J.L. & ECON. 223, 226 (1978); see also James A. Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational 
Form: The Case of Franchising, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 402 (1987) (“[T]he trade-off between agency problems 
associated with each form of organization is an important variable in explaining how firms choose between the 
two organizational forms.”). 
 378 See Brickley & Dark, supra note 377, at 403–07. 
 379 See Benjamin Klein, Transactions Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. 
ECON. REV. 356, 358–60 (1980) (discussing opportunism by franchisors and franchisees). 
 380 See id. at 358 (“Given the difficulty of explicitly specifying and enforcing contractually every element 
of quality to be supplied by a franchisee, there is an incentive for an individual opportunistic franchisee to 
cheat the franchisor by supplying a lower quality of product than contracted for.”). 
 381 Uri Benoliel, The Behavioral Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 527, 
529 (2010). 
 382 See id. at 530 (“[O]pportunistic actions are likely to significantly increase the franchisor’s monitoring 
costs and thereby off-set the reduction of the franchisor’s product-quality monitoring costs arguably generated 
by a franchise tying contract.”). 
 383 See Klein, supra note 379, at 359 (“[T]he franchisor may engage in opportunistic behavior by 
terminating a franchisee without cause, claiming the franchise fee and purchasing the initial franchisee 
investment at a distress price.”). 
 384 See Patrick J. Kaufmann & Francine Lafontaine, Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for 
McDonald’s Franchisees, 37 J.L. & ECON. 417, 419 (1994). 
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existing franchisees by authorizing new franchisees or establishing new outlets 
to compete in the same geographic area.385 
Franchises are an important organizational form because they are distinct 
from other types of inclusion like contracts and leases. Although similar to 
contracts, franchises differ because franchise law entails certain mandatory 
rules (e.g., limitations on termination) and attempts to deter renegotiation in 
ways that contract law generally does not.386 Franchises are also similar to 
leases because a franchisor is leasing the use of its trademark to a franchisee 
for a period of time.387 But, unlike leases, franchises do not entail any implied 
warranties; instead, franchisees bear almost all the risk of a new franchise.388 
Franchises also differ from corporations because they have different 
residual claimants and control agency costs in different ways.389 In a franchise, 
the franchisees are the residual claimants and thus have an incentive to monitor 
their employees in ways that shareholders generally do not.390 Moreover, 
unlike corporations as well as trusts, franchises generally do not impose any 
fiduciary obligations on the franchisor.391 
Finally, the Federal Trade Commission requires a franchisor to provide a 
disclosure document to a franchisee fourteen days before finalizing a franchise 
agreement.392 This mandatory disclosure is an attempt to reduce asymmetric 
information.393 In addition to regulating entry, the law attempts to regulate exit 
 
 385 See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 191, 193 (2010). See generally 
Uri Benoliel, Criticizing the Economic Analysis of Franchise Encroachment Law, 75 ALB. L. REV. 205 (2012) 
(discussing the short- and long-term effects of current franchise encroachment law).  
 386 See R. Preston McAfee & Marius Schwartz, Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: 
Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 210, 210 (1994). 
 387 See Rubin, supra note 377, at 224. 
 388 Franchise agreements usually do not include guarantees or warranties for franchisees. See Robert W. 
Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and the Franchisor’s Duty of Care Toward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C. L. 
REV. 905, 959 (1994). 
 389 See Steven C. Michael, To Franchise or Not To Franchise: An Analysis of Decision Rights and 
Organizational Form Shares, 11 J. BUS. VENTURING 57, 61 (1996). 
 390 See Rubin, supra note 377, at 226. 
 391 See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Cardinal Oil Co., 535 F. Supp. 661, 666 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (holding that an 
obligation of good faith under Wisconsin contract law does not make the franchisor–franchisee relationship a 
fiduciary one); Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. 823 S.W.2d 591, 594–96 (Tex. 1992) 
(rejecting the imposition of general fiduciary duties on the franchise relationship); see also Emerson, supra 
note 388, at 922–26 (arguing that only “some clauses in a franchise contract merit the imposition of fiduciary 
duties” but a general fiduciary duty for the relationship is not appropriate). 
 392 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a) (2013).  
 393 Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444, 15,534 (Mar. 
30, 2007) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 436–37). 
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via franchise termination laws that prevent strategic termination.394 Franchisors 
structure agreements to minimize franchisee opportunism and choose this form 
if it will reduce their own agency costs, so the law generally seeks to reduce 
the possibility of franchisor opportunism.395 
c. Co-ownership 
Finally, co-ownership itself entails a type of inclusion if an existing owner 
includes a nonowner in her property.396 Including a nonowner as a co-owner 
may facilitate sharing (if gratuitous) or exchange (if for some consideration).397 
Co-ownership also can provide a financing function if one (or more) of the co-
owners provides capital or assists in paying a mortgage.398 Co-ownership may 
play a risk-spreading function, especially in the absence of insurance or other 
support systems.399 Co-ownership also can facilitate various types of functional 
specialization, from organizing a household400 to operating a taxicab.401 
Indeed, co-ownership can be an alternative to other forms of inclusion, such as 
forming a trust, partnership, or corporation.402  
 
 394 See Jonathan Klick et al., Federalism, Variation, and State Regulation of Franchise Termination, 3 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 355, 364 (2009) (noting trade-off in termination laws between “reducing ‘cream 
skimming’” by franchisors and “preventing franchisors from disciplining shirking franchisees”).  
 395 See Antony W. Dnes, Franchise Contracts, Opportunism and the Quality of Law, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL 
BUS. L.J. 257, 270–73 (2009). 
 396 If an owner includes a nonowner as a co-owner, the new co-owner has a separate but undivided 
interest in the property. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 596 (“[E]ach interest is undivided, in the sense 
that each tenant in common has the right to possess the whole of the property . . . .”). 
 397 See id. at 594 (“There are many reasons for multiple people to wish to be co-owners, involving various 
types of multiple use and relationships based on sharing.”). 
 398 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH 85 (2008) 
(citing Sandra Fleishman, The Buddy System; A New Theory of Buying Power: With Double the Income, Even 
Singles Can Afford Double the House, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2001, at H.1; Jim Rendon, Splitting the Cost of 
Buying a House, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2004, § 11 at 1). Legal barriers may prevent certain types of lending 
among co-owners. See Bradley T. Borden, Open Tenancies-in-Common, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 387, 428 
(2009) (“The IRS’s prohibition against inter-co-owner lending finds little support in economic theory.”). Co-
ownership also may impose additional monitoring costs on lenders. See Alex R. Pederson, The Rejuvenation of 
the Tenancy-in-Common Form for Like-Kind Exchanges and Its Impact on Lenders, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 467, 480 (2005). 
 399 See Ellickson, supra note 16, at 1341. 
 400 See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 30–53 (1991) (discussing the division of labor in 
households and families); ELLICKSON, supra note 398, at 77 (“An increase in numbers may make it easier for 
housemates . . . to specialize in their work both within and beyond the home.”). 
 401 See BARZEL, supra note 110, at 57–58. 
 402 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 595 (“For example, if A, B, and C want to share ownership of 
a summer cottage, they could either hold title to the cottage as concurrent owners, or they could form a 
partnership or corporation which would then hold title to the cottage.”). 
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But co-ownership involves a risk of opportunism. In real property, co-
owners may fail to share rental income or pay their portion of the expenses.403 
In intellectual property, Arti Rai et al. point out that “[p]atent law encourages 
strategic behavior on the part of co-owners by allowing each one to ‘make, use, 
offer to sell, or sell the patented invention . . . without the consent of and 
without accounting to the other owners.’”404 Likewise, Robert Merges and 
Lawrence Locke note that this “common ownership problem highlights the fact 
that co-owners have incentives to behave ‘opportunistically’ with respect to 
one another—i.e., to cheat on each other.”405 
Co-ownership may entail excessive utilization or inadequate maintenance 
because “[t]he effects of the use by each co-owner are only partially 
internalized to that owner.”406 Yoram Barzel provides a particularly vivid 
example of this problem, a cab that is owned and operated by two people.407 
Given shared ownership of the cab, there is a danger that either owner may 
engage in excessive use.408 While the co-owners may delineate time slots or 
“shifts” for using the cab and pay for their own fuel, certain items like tires, 
upholstery, and the engine are more likely to become common property.409 
Like the law governing other forms, co-ownership law has developed 
mechanisms to mitigate strategic behavior and conflicts over use. For example, 
the right of partition “gives each cotenant an automatic right to terminate the 
cotenancy at any time.”410 By giving a co-owner the ability to exit ex post, 
 
 403 See Evelyn Alicia Lewis, Struggling with Quicksand: The Ins and Outs of Cotenant Possession Value 
Liability and a Call for Default Rule Reform, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 331, 349. 
 404 Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for 
Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 23 (2008) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 262 
(2006)). 
 405 Robert P. Merges & Lawrence A. Locke, Co-ownership of Patents: A Comparative and Economics 
View, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 586, 592 (1990). 
 406 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 594–95; see also supra Part II.B.3 (discussing similar conflicts 
between owners and nonowners). On the potential problems of common ownership, see generally ELINOR 
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1990) 
(discussing a “pasture ‘open to all’” and noting that “[e]ach herder is motivated to add more and more animals 
because he receives the direct benefit of his own animals and bears only a share of the costs resulting from 
overgrazing”); Demsetz, supra note 9, at 357 (“[A]n increase in the number of owners is an increase in the 
communality of property and leads, generally, to an increase in the cost of internalizing.”); Ellickson, supra 
note 16, at 1327 (noting that group, unlike individual, ownership entails the “transaction costs of monitoring 
potential shirkers and grabbers within the group’s membership”). 
 407 See BARZEL, supra note 110, at 57. 
 408 Id. at 57–58. 
 409 See id. 
 410 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 598. 
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partition may reduce the incentive to act opportunistically ex ante.411 However, 
because any co-owner may utilize partition to force a sale of the entire 
property, a co-owner also may employ partition strategically.412 
Another co-ownership arrangement, one that may arise if there is a high 
risk of opportunism, is a semicommons. A semicommons is a mixed form of 
ownership containing both private and common property, which interact with 
each other.413 As a result, a semicommons usually entails a risk of opportunism 
by owners as well as nonowners.414 For example, if a private landowner is also 
the common herdsman in a common field, the landowner “would have an 
incentive not only to shirk but also to favor his own land,” by preventing 
trampling or hoarding manure.415 As Henry Smith hypothesizes, the scattering 
and intermixing of plots of land in the medieval open fields system made it 
“difficult to direct animals in the common herd grazing on the commons away 
from anyone’s plots and toward any other plots.”416 Ultimately, as Smith points 
out, a semicommons is likely to arise only “if the benefits of multiple use are 
worth incurring the costs of abating strategic behavior.”417 
 
 411 See id. at 604 (“Partition affords each co-owner an avenue for exit, and the threat of exit can help a co-
owner protect her interests.”).  
 412 See Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black 
Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 
NW. U. L. REV. 505, 508 (2001); John G. Casagrande Jr., Note, Acquiring Property Through Forced 
Partitioning Sales: Abuses and Remedies, 27 B.C. L. REV. 755, 756–57 (1986); see also supra notes 318–19 
and accompanying text.  
 413 See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 131, 131–33 (2000) (identifying the open fields system as a semicommons).  
 414 Unlike prior explanations for scattering strips in open fields that emphasize diversifying risk, Smith 
emphasizes the role of strategic behavior. See id. at 146–54; see also Robert A. Heverly, The Information 
Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127, 1172–83 (2003) (discussing strategic behavior in “the 
information semicommons”). 
 415 Smith, supra note 413, at 146–47, 149 (footnote omitted). 
 416 Id. at 147. 
 417 Henry E. Smith, Governing the Tele-Semicommons, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 299 (2005). In addition 
to open fields, scholars have identified semicommons in the Internet, information and creative works, 
telecommunications, water rights, and software standards. See Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, 
and Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 89, at 35, 
46–49 (discussing semicommons); James Grimmelmann, The Internet Is a Semicommons, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2799, 2799 (2010) (“[T]he Internet [is] a particularly striking example of . . . a semicommons.”); Heverly, 
supra note 414, at 1127 (“Information . . . is a semicommons.”); Smith, supra, at 289 (describing the regime 
created by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as a semicommons); Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The 
Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 445 (2008) (“The challenges of exclusion that 
water and other fugitive resources present often lead to a semicommons . . . .”); Greg R. Vetter, Open Source 
Licensing and Scattering Opportunism in Software Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 225, 226 (2007) (“Software 
Standards are a type of technology semicommons.”). 
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TABLE 1: 
FORMS OF INCLUSION & ANTI-OPPORTUNISM DEVICES 
Form of Inclusion Mandatory Rules Fiduciary Duties 
1. Contracts 
good faith and fair dealing; duty not to 
defraud; UCC = quantity term 
No 
2. Licenses 
implicated more often in certain licenses 
(e.g., software licenses) than contracts 
No 
3. Easements benefit and burden “run with the land” No 
4. Residential Leases 
Tenant (T): implied warranty of habitability 
(IWH); Landlord (L): constructive eviction  
No 
5. Commercial Leases 
T: no IWH or suitability, but good faith and 
fair dealing; L: constructive eviction  
No 
6. Agricultural Leases 
T: no IWH; 
implied covenant of good husbandry 
No 
7. Bailments 
strict liability for misdelivery; 
non-disclaimable rules to standardize 
No 
8. Cooperatives IWH (residents = lessees) 
board = loyalty (BJR = 
business judgment rule) 
9. Condominiums no IWH; restrictions = “reasonable” 
board = loyalty + care; 
developers (split) 
10. Donative Trusts 
Unif. Trust Code (UTC) § 105(b): benefit of 
beneficiaries, modify, inform, good faith 
loyalty (sole benefit);  
care (no BJR) 
11. Charitable Trusts UTC § 105(b); “charitable purpose” 
loyalty (sole benefit); 
care (no BJR) 
12. Nonprofits 
“any lawful purpose” but no distribution of 
net earnings 
loyalty + care 
(similar to corporation) 
13. Business Trusts 
fiduciary duties (in ERISA); information 
disclosure (in mutual funds); no exculpation  
loyalty + care 
(no BJR) 
14. Partnerships 
Rev. Unif. Partnership Act (RUPA) § 103: 
duty of loyalty/care (unless reasonable or 
approved); good faith; disassociate; expel 
RUPA § 404: loyalty; care 
(gross negligence); good 
faith/fair dealing 
15. Corporations 
duty of loyalty; meetings of directors and 
shareholders; disclosure; no insider trading 
loyalty (best interest); 
care (BJR) + exculpation 
16. Franchises good faith; franchise termination laws No 
17. Co-ownership 
each co-owner has an undivided interest = 
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TABLE 1 (CONT.): 
FORMS OF INCLUSION & ANTI-OPPORTUNISM DEVICES 
Form of Inclusion Remedies Other Doctrines  
1. Contracts 
compensatory damages ($); at times, 
specific performance (SP); no punitive $ 
duress; unconscionability; 
limitations on stipulated $  
2. Licenses 
compensatory $; at times, SP; 
injunctive relief under Copyright Act 
irrevocable only if grant or 
easement by estoppel; misuse  
3. Easements 
If abuse of the easement, injunction = 
majority rule; $ = minority rule 
irrevocable but can abandon; 
presumption against variation 
4. Residential Leases 
T: $, reformation, or rescission;  
L: terminate = $ or maintain = back rent  
T: can assign; no waste; 
L: duty to mitigate  
5. Commercial Leases 
T: $ (disfavor SP); L: T liable as rent is 
due, re-let for T, or accept surrender  
T: can assign; no waste; 
L: no duty to mitigate  
6. Agricultural Leases 
L breaches  T must perform, sue for $; 
T breaches  L must perform, sue for $  
T: no waste; 
L: no duty to mitigate  
7. Bailments 
tort: $ for destruction, conversion, harm;  
contract: $ (including foreseeable $) 
bailee’s duty of care = default; 
often, small stakes 
8. Cooperatives 
liens; ejectment (some states); breach of 
IWH  $ = maintenance – rental value  
financial disclosure; board 
approval; often no subleasing 
9. Condominiums 
$ and injunctions (vs. board, neighbors, 
or developer); board brings some claims  
no partition right; restrictions 
on leasing/subleasing 
10. Donative Trusts 
against trustee (UTC § 1001) = $; 
removal (UTC § 706)  
asset partitioning; spendthrift 
clause; ascertainable Bs 
11. Charitable Trusts 
injunctions; $; cy pres (reform as near as 
possible to intent); removal (UTC § 706) 
asset partitioning 
12. Nonprofits 
injunctions; $; cy pres; lose exemption; 
personal liability; $ (= taxes owed) 
certain disclosures to IRS 
13. Business Trusts 
against trustee = $; 
removal of trustee (less rigorous) 
asset partitioning; conduit 
taxation; voting rights 
14. Partnerships 
$, all partners jointly and severally 
liable, unless limited liability; 
dissociation (RUPA § 602) 
limited liability (LLP, LLLP) 
15. Corporations $, injunctions; also, derivative actions 
asset partitioning; limited 
liability; voting rights 
16. Franchises $, injunctions, future royalties (newer) disclosure document (FTC) 
17. Co-ownership 
partition (for any reason or no reason); 
accounting if partition or ouster 
less customizable than trusts, 
partnerships, or corporations 
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* * * 
Overall, each type of inclusion—informal, contractual, and proprietary—
has distinct advantages and disadvantages. Informal inclusion usually entails 
little cost but may provide little certainty and few protections against 
opportunism. Contractual inclusion is more costly to create and enforce but 
may provide greater certainty and deter certain types of strategic behavior. 
Contracts typically entail default rules, arms-length negotiations or standard 
forms, and compensatory remedies. They also bind only the parties to the 
agreement. By contrast, property forms not only bind third parties in ways that 
contracts cannot but also entail a number of additional anti-opportunism 
devices, including mandatory rules, fiduciary duties, and supracompensatory 
remedies. These anti-opportunism devices help to deter certain types of 
opportunism that contracts, by themselves, address only imperfectly. 
Moreover, as the discussion above highlights and diagram above illustrates, 
each property form entails a unique combination of anti-opportunism devices 
and thus serves a distinct functional purpose. Overall, this proliferation of 
forms helps to ensure that an owner’s private incentive to include others 
converges with the level of inclusion that is socially optimal. 
IV.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCLUSION 
A. The Property/Contract Interface 
Understanding how owners include others has implications not only for law 
reform but also for property theory. Recently, there has been significant 
interest in the distinction between property and contract.418 Because inclusion 
is highly customizable,419 many forms of property appear to converge with 
contract.420 As a result, there is a tendency among some courts, law reformers, 
and legal scholars to adopt a contractarian approach for many forms, including 
licenses, leases, easements, trusts, and corporations.421 
 
 418 See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 117, at S378; see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, 
at 774. 
 419 See supra Table 1. 
 420 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 774. 
 421 See, e.g., McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Whether express or 
implied, a license is a contract governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“[A] warranty 
of habitability . . . is implied by operation of law into leases of urban dwelling units . . . and th[e] breach of this 
warranty gives rise to the usual remedies for breach of contract.”); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 356, 
at 15 (utilizing an “analogy to contract” to analyze the structure of corporations); French, supra note 242, at 
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Yet, while many property forms involve contractual elements, most of 
these forms differ from contracts in several ways.422 Because property rights 
are in rem and run with the land, these forms often provide more certainty over 
time, especially for future owners and users. Moreover, as discussed above, 
many of the property forms provide additional protection against certain types 
of opportunism because they rely to a greater extent on mandatory rules (to 
prevent strategic bargaining), fiduciary duties (to reduce agency costs), and 
supracompensatory remedies (to deter opportunistic breach). Thus, rather than 
converging with contracts, these property forms perform distinct functions. 
The reason that the law authorizes “multiple doctrines with differing rules 
by which rights are subdivided”423 is to promote and facilitate cooperative 
activities. Owners are more likely to include others if they are able to select 
from among multiple forms, each of which entails a unique combination of 
anti-opportunism devices. In certain situations, nonowners also may prefer 
proprietary inclusion over informal or contractual inclusion because of the 
certainty and protection against opportunism that particular forms of property 
may provide. By reducing the risk of opportunism and other costs of inclusion, 
a proliferation of property forms helps to ensure that the private incentive to 
include converges with the socially optimal level of inclusion. 
One lesson for courts and law reformers is that attempting to eliminate the 
forms as functionally obsolete, or to rely exclusively on contracts to promote 
the inclusion of others, may be misguided. Instead, by authorizing multiple 
forms of inclusion, including informal, contractual, and proprietary inclusion, 
the law promotes the social use of property. 
B. The Numerus Clausus Principle 
There is a related debate about why property provides pre-packaged or 
“off-the-rack” forms. That is, why does contract allow free customizability, 
whereas property entails a numerus clausus principle, in which the number of 
forms is limited or closed?424 One theory is that off-the-rack forms reduce 
 
1310 (“[C]ontract law . . . can be applied to servitudes.”); Langbein, supra note 340, at 671 (arguing for the 
“contractarian vision of the trust”). 
 422 See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing justifications for distinguishing between contractual inclusion and 
proprietary inclusion). 
 423 Stake, supra note 69, at 42. 
 424 For a seminal analysis framing the issue, see generally Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property 
Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: THIRD SERIES 239 (John 
Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987). 
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bargaining costs.425 A second theory, developed by Merrill and Smith, is that 
some degree of standardization based on a menu of forms reduces information 
costs.426 A third theory, formulated by Hansmann and Kraakman, is that the 
law regulates the type and degree of notice for creating different kinds of 
property to minimize verification costs.427 
This Article does not contradict any of these theories. It also emphasizes 
transaction costs (broadly understood). Like Hansmann and Kraakman, this 
Article emphasizes the role of opportunism.428 However, unlike Hansmann and 
Kraakman, who focus mainly on third-party opportunism,429 the primary focus 
of this Article is on the risk of opportunism between the owner and nonowner. 
The law authorizes, and attempts to maintain, the contours of a (limited) 
number of forms in order to provide mechanisms for reducing opportunism and 
facilitating inclusion. The law provides these various forms as “focal points” 
around which parties can organize their activities by including others through 
different combinations of anti-opportunism devices.430 Hence, property forms 
not only can facilitate communication among market participants by reducing 
information costs, and facilitate verification of ownership of rights offered for 
conveyance by reducing verification costs, but these forms also create more 
opportunities for cooperation between the original parties themselves. 
The point does not contradict Merrill and Smith’s observation that the costs 
of complex property interests are usually incorporated into the price of an 
asset.431 Most of the costs discussed above, including disputes about 
coordination, the costs of opportunism, and conflicts over use, like excessive 
utilization and inadequate maintenance, are not third-party externalities. 
Instead, such costs affect only the owner seeking to include or the nonowner 
seeking to benefit from being included. However, if the incentive to include is 
too low and diverges from the optimal level of inclusion, there is a social loss 
 
 425 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, What Government Can Do for Property (and Vice Versa), in THE 
FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY 209, 213 (Nicholas Mercuro & 
Warren J. Samuels eds., 1999) (“[O]ff-the-rack property devices can reduce transactions costs . . . .”). 
 426 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 184, at 40; see also supra notes 182–84. 
 427 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 117, at S399–400; see also supra notes 185–89. 
 428 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 117, at S382–84. 
 429 See id. 
 430 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57–59, 71–74 (1980) (discussing the value 
of focal points in tacit coordination, tacit bargaining, and explicit bargaining); cf. John H. Langbein, 
Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 493–94 (1975) (discussing the “channeling” 
function of legal formalities for wills).  
 431 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 184, at 28–29. 
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because certain types of inclusion that otherwise would occur may not. A legal 
system that supports inclusion through the optimal set of forms expands the 
production-possibility frontier by increasing the number of opportunities for 
parties to cooperate in socially beneficial ways.432 
A related, but relatively unexplored, question is how many forms are 
optimal.433 The question is especially salient in the context of the property 
forms that enable inclusion. Some courts have questioned the significance of 
such forms, suggesting that the forms are antiquated or unnecessary.434 If so, 
then it may be socially beneficial to reduce the number of forms, or eliminate 
them altogether. Conversely, sometimes a single form (e.g., a lease) applies in 
multiple contexts (agricultural, commercial, and residential) in which owners 
may have different objectives and the form itself may serve different purposes 
(e.g., financing, risk-spreading, and specialization).435 If so, then it could be 
useful to divide the forms further so they correspond more closely with their 
functions. 
This Article suggests that restricting the menu of forms too much, or 
eliminating them altogether, would be undesirable. There are advantages to 
having multiple forms of property by which parties may include others. Each 
form serves a unique function. At the same time, if the property forms were 
freely customizable, the forms might be less effective as focal points in 
facilitating coordination and cooperation. Because too much customizability 
would result in confusion among the basic categories of forms, maintaining 
clear distinctions among forms allows parties to select the form that minimizes 
 
 432 See JAMES D. GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 42 (12th ed. 2009) 
(“Changes in legal institutions that promote social cooperation . . . will also push the production possibilities 
curve outward.”). 
 433 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 184, at 40 (“We do not argue that any particular number of property 
forms is in fact optimal.”). 
 434 See, e.g., Golden W. Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 378, 395 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(noting that “[l]ittle practical purpose is served by attempting to build on this system of classification” because 
“it is increasingly difficult and correspondingly irrelevant to attempt to pigeonhole these relationships as 
‘leases,’ ‘easements,’ ‘licenses,’ ‘profits,’ or some other obscure interest in land devised by the common law in 
far simpler times”). 
 435 See, e.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 650 (“One problem that has long vexed lease law in the 
real property context is that it does not differentiate between leases in terms of the underlying functional 
reasons the parties have for entering into a lease.”); Carol M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places?, 114 
YALE L.J. 991, 1006 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2003); and 
KAREN R. MERRILL, PUBLIC LANDS AND POLITICAL MEANING: RANCHERS, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE 
PROPERTY BETWEEN THEM (2002)) (“The modern residential lease is worlds away from the agricultural lease 
of the sixteenth century or from the modern commercial lease in a shopping center, but property makes room 
for all of them.”). 
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the risk of opportunism. Of course, as the benefits and costs of inclusion 
change over time, the law can add or subtract new forms of inclusion and rely 
on new devices and doctrines to deter opportunism. 
C. The Right to Exclude Revisited 
In analyzing the “social” dimensions of property, the prior literature 
focuses on how using property may generate social costs and how owning it 
may entail social obligations.436 By contrast, in analyzing the right to include, 
this Article highlights another social dimension of property: property forms 
can facilitate cooperation and, in doing so, promote the social use of scarce 
resources.437 
As noted above, one conventional view of private property is that property 
rights are individualistic. Marx believed that human beings could return to 
their true “social” existence only by transcending property.438 More recently, a 
number of theorists have commented on the connection between property and 
exclusive rights, on one hand, and individualism, on the other. For example, 
Eduardo Peñalver notes that “the individualistic school of property thought is 
certainly the dominant one within Anglo-American property law.”439 Likewise, 
James Penner observes: “Our paradigm or standard ‘picture’ of property 
comprises the single owner, along with their goods, occupying their land, to 
the exclusion of others.”440 To a certain extent, this conventional picture of 
property is descriptively accurate: individual rights in private property are a 
central feature of any market economy. But many commentators often assume 
that, because of this right to exclude, ownership is fundamentally inconsistent, 
incompatible, or in tension with the “social function” of property.441 
Recognizing that owners have a right to include, as well as exclude, helps 
to clarify the social nature of property. Some owners may misuse their property 
by imposing social costs on others, isolating themselves from others, or 
 
 436 See supra notes 7–8. 
 437 See PENNER, supra note 4, at 74–75; Penner, supra note 5, at 167. 
 438 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 439 Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International Norms, and the 
Property Reforms of the Cuban Revolution, 52 FLA. L. REV. 107, 195 (2000). 
 440 Penner, supra note 5, at 166 (footnote omitted).  
 441 Sheila R. Foster & Daniel Bonilla, Introduction to Symposium, The Social Function of Property: A 
Comparative Perspective, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1003–04 (2011); cf. Penner, supra note 5, at 188 
(noting “the individualistic taint which has attached itself to ownership, at least amongst legal and political 
philosophers”).  
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discriminating against others. But many owners decide to use their property 
not only as a “wall” to exclude others but also as a “gate” to include their 
neighbors, friends and family, colleagues and customers, and even strangers 
who need help.442 If so, property is capable of promoting human sociability, 
not merely atomistic individualism. In this way, understanding the right to 
include may assist in properly contextualizing the right to exclude and perhaps 
reconciling competing perspectives about the function of property.443 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has investigated how owners may include, as well as exclude, 
others from their property. Until now, this “right to include” has received little 
attention. But inclusion plays a valuable role in coordinating economic 
activities and social relationships. By promoting sharing and exchange, 
facilitating financing and risk-spreading, and enabling specialization, inclusion 
can be highly beneficial. But inclusion also entails costs, such as coordination 
difficulties, conflicts over use, and other types of strategic behavior. 
There is thus a danger that the risk of opportunism may result in owners 
including others too little. If law did not provide a range of options to reduce 
strategic behavior, owners may decide not to include others in their property. 
But the law provides multiple forms of inclusion: informal, contractual, and 
proprietary. Informal inclusion entails the nonenforcement or waiver of an 
owner’s right to exclude. Contractual inclusion involves a formal waiver of 
exclusion. However, in addition to informal or contractual inclusion, owners 
may include others through various forms of property, including easements, 
leases, bailments, condos and co-ops, trusts, partnerships, and corporations. 
Each of these forms entails a unique mix of mandatory rules, fiduciary duties, 
and supracompensatory remedies. By providing more certainty and protection 
against opportunism, these forms help ensure that an owner’s private incentive 
to include converges with the level of inclusion that is socially optimal. 
Analyzing the forms of inclusion suggests that the law should continue to 
provide a range of options by which owners may include others. Because each 
of the forms plays a unique role in deterring opportunism, these forms are 
distinct from one another as well as from contracts. Authorizing a menu of 
 
 442 Cf. Penner, supra note 24, at 745 (arguing that “the ability to share one’s things, or let others use them, 
is fundamental in the idea of property” (italics removed)). 
 443 Cf. Dagan & Heller, supra note 318, at 622 (“Sympathizers of privatization and communitarian 
approaches have seen conflict where there can be—and from a global perspective, often is—harmony.”). 
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forms not only reduces information and verification costs but also facilitates 
cooperation by providing parties with focal points to coordinate their activities. 
Ultimately, analyzing the many ways in which owners can include others in the 
use, possession, and enjoyment of their property suggests that ownership is not 
necessarily exclusive or individualistic. Rather, ownership is often inclusive 
and thereby promotes the social use of property. 
 
